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NATIONAL-SECURITY LAW IN OUTER SPACE:




T HE RELATIONSHIP between law and technology is often
misunderstood. It is important to realize that law never
seeks to regulate technology, but rather aims to place order in
the competing human interests that result from technology. In-
ternational law is loyal to this premise, and so is the corpus of
space law that has followed our astronauts into space, and which
now regulates the access and use of outer space. Space possesses
a fundamental paradoxical nature. Space exploration has its
roots in the systemic competition of the superpowers during the
Cold War. The Cold War produced the greatest national-secur-
ity concerns our planet has ever seen. Nonetheless, it has also
produced the greatest exploration project mankind has ever at-
tempted, literally reaching for the stars. During the Cold War,
the superpowers showed enlightened self-interest in producing
normative instruments that now form the essence of our space
law. As a result, both space national-security concerns and the
dreams of space exploration for the good of humanity, were in-
trinsic within the genesis of space law. Although the Cold War is
over, space national-security law endures, bearing this unshake-
able paradox as the mark of its origins. The matrix of national-
security law applicable to outer space has not only survived the
Cold War, but also evolves within a new geo-political security en-
vironment. Space power, namely the ability of a state to use
outer space in its civil, commercial, and military dimensions, is
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Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, and at the International
Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy; Fellow of the Centre for
Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
The views, opinions and conclusions expressed in this article are those of the
author alone and should not be construed as those of Canada, other individuals,
or institutions.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
gaining in importance.2 In recent conflicts, space capabilities
have proven to bring an asymmetrical advantage to military op-
erations, irrespective of the terrain of the operation.' This arti-
cle will describe and analyze the international instruments that
regulate the national-security concerns of states within outer
space.
II. DISCUSSION
A. THE SPACE NATIONAL-SECURITY LEGAL MATRIX
The international legal matrix that regulates national-security
law in outer space can be divided into those normative instru-
ments that are designed to apply during times of peace, and
those that are designed to apply during an international armed
conflict. The dichotomy of the public international normative
matrix simply mirrors the U.N. Charter.4 The U.N. Charter pro-
hibits the use of force by states within their international rela-
tions, stating that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
dlnited Nations. ' 5 Nonetheless, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
recognizes the inherent right of states to use force through self-
defense stating that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall im-
pair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations."6
2 It is interesting to note that, in discussing sea power, Admiral Mahan wrote
that "the principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations [include] ...
Character of the government including therein the national institutions." ALFRED
THAYER MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783 28-29
(Little Brown 1939). This comment holds true for space power. For a more
recent analysis of space power and liberal democratic values, see Everett Carl Dol-
man, Space Power and U.S. Hegemony: Maintaining a Liberal World Order in the 21st
Century, in SPACE WEAPONS: ARE THEY NEEDED? 37 (John M. Logston & Gordon
Adams eds., 2003).
3 Air Force Space Command, Strategic Master Plan FY06 and Beyond (copy on file
with author).
4 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
5 Id.
6 U.N. CHARTER art. 51; see also THOMAS M. FRANK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, STATE
ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACK (Cambridge University Press 2002)
(analyzing legality of use of force); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-
DEFENCE (Cambridge University Press ed., 1994); Oscar Schachter, The Right of
States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv 1620 (1984). Concerning self-defense in
outer space, see JOHN COBB COOPER, Self Defence in Outer Space and the United Na-
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The importance of this analytical dichotomy lies in the fact
that, during times of international armed conflict, treaties are
tions, in EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW, SELECTED ESSAYS BYJOHN COBB COOPER
413 (McGill University Press 1968); Hamilton DeSaussure, et al., Self-Defense-A
Right in Outer Space, 7 A.F.L. REv. 38-45 (1965). More recently, NandasiriJasentu-
liyana argued that the treaty-structure encompassing "national technical means"
circumscribed the right of self defense. He stated that:
While an attack on civilian satellites and space activities or on mili-
tary systems protected under bilateral arms control agreements are
not considered to fall within the meaning of self defence under
article 51 of the Charter, there is no consensus as to whether an
attack on other military systems, particularly space weapon systems,
is covered under this right of self defence.
NANDASIRI JASENTULYANA, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS
102 (The Hague 1999). Nonetheless, the importance of space and space assets to
the U.S. is articulated in Department of Defense Directive No. 3100.10 (July 9, 1999),
which states at article 4.1 that:
Space is a medium like the land, sea and air within which military
activities shall be conducted to achieve U.S. national-security objec-
tives. The ability to access and utilize space is a vital national inter-
est because many of the activities conducted in the medium are
critical to U.S. national-security and economic well-being.
Id. Furthermore, the document stresses that "U.S. space systems are national
property afforded the right of passage through and operations in space without
interference," and then establishes the possible consequences of interference
with US space assets, stating that "[p]urposeful interference with U.S. space sys-
tems will be viewed as a infringement on our sovereign rights. The U.S. may take
all appropriate self-defense measures, including, if directed by the National Com-
mand Authorities (NCA), the use of force, to respond to such an infringement
on U.S. rights." Id. art. 4.2, 4.2.1. The importance of space military operations is
highlighted by the fact that the United States' decision to use force against space
assets is made at the highest level of command, namely the NCA, according to
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's instructions, stating that
"[m]ilitary or civilian space systems such as communication satel-
lites or commercial earth-imaging systems may be used to support a
hostile action" and that due to "significant political and economic
repercussions, "[ulnless specifically authorized by the NCA, com-
manders may not conduct operations against space-based systems
or ground and link segments of space systems."
National Command Authorities, U.S., Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces
CJCSI3121.O1A (Jan. 15, 2000) at C4. The NCA is "[t]he President and the Sec-
retary of Defense or their duly deputized alternatives or successors." See U.S., (JP
1-02) Joint Publication 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations (Apr. 5,
2000). In interpreting the U.N. Charter and its applicability to space, see Robert
L. Bridge, International Law and Military Activities in Outer Space, 13 AKRON L. REV.
649, 659-60 (1979) (arguing that the concept of "territorial integrity" within arti-
cle 2(4) "may refer not only to the land mass of a State, but also to its human and
natural resources in space," and that "[i]nterference with the operation of a satel-
lite ... could be claimed by the owner State as the threat or use of force against
its territorial integrity, giving rise to assertions of the right to act in self-defense
.. ).
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generally suspended between belligerents. Publicists are, how-
ever, uncertain of the real effect of this dichotomy on space na-
tional-security law.7  Despite this doctrinal hesitation, the
dichotomy remains nevertheless a useful analytical structure to
understand the space national-security legal matrix.
1. Space National-security Peace Time Treaties
Treaties applicable to peacetime national-security in outer
space can in turn be divided into three types: treaties that have
been specifically designed to regulate space activities, treaties
that were designed as confidence-building measures regulating
peacetime military space-related activities, and treaties that regu-
late economic aspects of peacetime space activities.
7 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331. Article 62 recognizes that a fundamental change in circumstances can be
invoked to either terminate or withdraw from a treaty. The initiation of armed
hostilities is a fundamental change in circumstances between the parties. Accord-
ing to Professor Brownlie, although "[h]ostile relations do not automatically ter-
minate treaties between parties to a conflict ... in state practice many types of
treatyl[sic] are regarded as at least suspended in time of war [sic], and war condi-
tions may lead to termination of treaties on grounds of impossibility or funda-
mental change of circumstances." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 614 (Clarendon Press 1979); see also PETER MALANCHUK,
AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 145 (7th rev. ed.
1997) (stating that "[o]riginally, war was regarded as ending all treaties between
belligerents states, but this rule has been partially abandoned. Maybe it is not so
much the rule which has changed, as the nature of the treaties between to which
the rule applies"). According to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS § 336(e) (1987), under traditional international law, the outbreak of war
between states terminated or suspended agreements between them. However,
not all agreements were necessarily affected. In particular, agreements gov-
erning the conduct of hostilities survived, since they were designed for applica-
tion during war. However, the U.N. Charter prohibits the use of armed force
between states except in limited circumstances, and was intended to outlaw war.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS § 905 cmt. g (1987). The conse-
quence of these principles for the law as to the effect of hostilities on treaties
remains uncertain. See Reporters' Note 4. The Vienna Convention refrains from
taking a position on this question. See art. 73. On making this point concerning
space treaties, Professor David A. Koplow writes that:
It is far from clear how the obligations of these treaties would oper-
ate in a time of war. The question of suspension or continued op-
eration of international legal undertakings during hostilities ...
focuses.., on the intention of the parties ... that is routinely not
directly disclosed in the [treaties'] text or negotiating history.
David A. Koplow, Paper presented to a roundtable discussion of the Lawyers Alli-
ance for World Security (Nov. 13, 2002) (unpublished paper available at Space
Policy Institute, George Washington University).
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a. The Space Treaties
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 ("OST") is commonly re-
ferred to as the Magna Carta of outer space and remains the
fundamental treaty establishing national-security law in outer
space.' As a multilateral treaty, the OST establishes within its
preamble a global homogeneous ethos for outer space, acknowl-
edging the "common interest of all mankind in the progress of
the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,"
stating that "the exploration and use of outer space should be
carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the de-
gree of their economic or scientific development," and stressing
that the exploration and use of outer space shall be for "peace-
ful purposes."9
The OST codifies the fundamental freedoms of outer space in
a negative libertarian perspective;10 namely, that "[o] uter space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for
exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any
kind on the basis of equality and in accordance with interna-
tional law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial
bodies," and that "[t]here shall be freedom of scientific investi-
gation in outer space . . . and other celestial bodies, and States
shall facilitate and encourage international co-operation in such
investigation."" The OST prevents possible destabilizing claims
of sovereignty or national appropriation in outer space, explic-
itly stating: "outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation." 12
The applicability of public international law to outer space is
formally codified within Article III of the OST, which states that
space activities are to be conducted "in accordance with interna-
tional law including the Charter of the United Nations, in the
interest of maintaining international peace and security ... ""
8 Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,Jan. 27,
1967, 720 U.N.T.S. 8843, Can. T.S. 1967 No. 19, T.I.A.S. 6347 [hereinafter OST].
According to the Committee of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, the OST had
ninety-eight State parties and had been signed by an additional twenty-seven
States. Report of the Legal Subcommittee, U.N. GAOR, 42nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/805 (2003) [hereinafter Report of the Legal Subcommittee].
9 OST, supra note 8.
,0 For the difference between positive and negative liberty, see IsAIA- BERLIN,
FOUR ESSAyS ON LIBERTy, (Oxford University Press 1967).
1 OST, supra note 8, art. I.
12 Id.
"I Id. art. II.
20051
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Consequently, the national-security implications of the OST
must be interpreted in light of the U.N. Charter, which, a forti-
0ri, is designed to have supremacy over subsequent treaties like
the OST. 14 The OST's normative deference to the U.N. Charter
necessarily implies the application of Articles 2(4) and 51 to
space national-security concerns; but to stop here would be a
facile interpretative error. A thorough grasp of Article III of the
OST requires a comparison of its terminology, combined with
that of the U.N. Charter. In fact, an understanding of the words
"international peace and security" within the Charter sense is a
fundamental sine qua non criterion to understanding the impor-
tance of OST Article III, its function, and its relevance to na-
tional-security law in outer space. There are two reasons for
this. First, the words "international peace and security" are
found in the U.N. Charter. 5 Secondly, the accepted interpreta-
tion of the term "security" within the U.N. Charter is that of a
positive peace, presupposing the "activity which is necessary for
maintaining the conditions of peace." This "necessary" military
activity includes self-defense and activity that has been legiti-
mized by the U.N. Security Council.1 6 Furthermore, the U.N.
Charter explicitly defines the means to maintain international
peace and security as the "effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the sup-
pression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace. '"17
Therefore, national-security law in outer space accepts military
action in outer space as necessary and legitimate, whether it is
pre-emptive or to maintain the conditions of peace.1 8 This pre-
14 See U.N. CHARTER art. 103 (containing a supremacy clause that gives it prece-
dence over subsequent treaties).
15 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
16 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 50 (Mosler et al. eds.,
Bruno Simma 1994).
17 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
18 Professor Cooper cogently argues for the applicability of the concept of pre-
emptive self-defense in outer space beyond state territory by applying the Caro-
lina case conditions, establishing "a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelm-
ing, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation." COOPER, supra
note 6, at 416. Pre-emptive use of force in space is advocated in recent USAF
doctrine, stating, "[d]enying adversary access to space capability and protecting
U.S. and friendly space capability may require taking the initiative to pre-empt or
otherwise impede an adversary." Counterspace Operations, Air Force Doctrine Doc-
ument 2-2.1, dated Aug. 2, 2004, at 31. The exercise of a unilateral right of pre-
emptive strike is a cornerstone of the Bush doctrine. There is an important dis-
tinction to be made between the pre-emptive use of force, as described in the
Carolina case, and pre-emptive use of force within the Bush doctrine. The Bush
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mise underlies any correct discussion of national-security law in
outer space.l"
The Security Council has explicit authority to determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression .2 " The Security Council may then recommend or
decide measures to be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and
42 of the U.N. Charter. Article 41 of the U.N. Charter allows
measures not involving the use of armed force. This includes
the possible interruption of "radio and other means of commu-
nication," which may include space assets. 2 ' Under Article 42 of
the U.N. Charter, the Security Council should first decide that
Article 41 measures have proven inadequate before justifiably
engaging in armed force.22 Under Article 39, a threat or breach
of peace does not presuppose the use of force." The Security
Council, thus, has the ability to determine what could be a
threat or breach of the peace in outer space.
Article 42 of the U.N. Charter lists possible measures that the
Security Council may consider, including "demonstrations,
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of
doctrine advocates the use of force "to prevent any possibility of a fuiture attack,
even where no prior attack has occurred and there is no certainty that a definite
armed attack has been planned for the future." Christian Henderson, The Bush
Doctrine: From Theory to Practice, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY 3, 24 (2004). The Caro-
lina case places the threshold for use of force at a much higher level than the
Bush Doctrine by requiring an imminent and irresistible use of force, leaving the
victim state with no other option. Although cloaked in "Carolina"-type vocabu-
lary, the Air Force Doctrine Document appears to refer more to the Bush doc-
trine vision of pre-emption.
19 Dr. Edward C. Welsh, the former Executive Secretary of the National Aero-
nautics and Space Council, commented on space and national-security in refer-
ence to the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 disposition that
"activities in space [should be devoted] to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all
mankind" in the following terms:
That is a sound policy for any vigorous, peace-loving nation. Even
though it is sound, however, I know also that it is sometimes misin-
terpreted. It does not mean that space has no military or defense
uses ... Nothing is more essential for peace than the capability to
discourage or deter attack. In my view, we do not have a division
between peaceful and non peaceful objectives for space. Rather,
we have space missions to help keep the peace and space missions
to help increase our ability to live well in peace.
See COOPER, supra note 6, at 415.
21 U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
21 Id. art. 41.
,2 Id. art. 42.
23 Id. art. 39.
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Members of the United Nations. '"24 Notably, "space" is absent
from this list. Does this mean that the Security Council may not
consider space military measures? Such a restrictive interpreta-
tion of Article 42 would probably be considered by most as je-
june. Considering that the sentence begins with "may include,"
one can proffer that the text presupposes that the list is indica-
tive rather than exhaustive. 25 Consequently, the Security Coun-
cil could consider space military measures. Lastly, the Members
of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the deci-
sions of the Security Council, which could include performance
of space military operations.26 In addition, the words "threat to
peace" are sufficiently broad so as to imply possible preemptive
measures to protect either access to space, the space-medium, or
space assets. 27 Considering the importance of the space-me-
dium and of space assets to both military operations and to the
global economy, preemption aimed at securing access to space
and the use of space assets gains importance.28
An important caveat must be stressed in the discussion of the
right to the preemptive use of force in space. The right of pre-
emption is akin to the double-edged sword of Damocles and
could be used tojustify strikes against U.S. space assets. 29 A pre-
emptive strike in space, which would strictly adhere to the
threshold on the use of force as imposed by the Carolina case,
could arguably be justified. Nonetheless, it is difficult to con-
ceive that an American unilateral strike in space, in accordance
with the Bush doctrine, aimed at preventing a future attack
where no prior attack has occurred, or where there is no cer-
24 Id. art. 42.
25 Id. Professor Lee has cogently analyzed the interface of the OST and the
UN Charter and proffered that, unless the restrictions on space military activities
established in the OST can be proven to be norms of jus cogens, the Security
Council, under Article 42 of the Charter, has the power to override the OST
restrictions on space military activities. See RJ. Lee, TheJus ad Bellum in spatialis:
The exact content and practical implications of the Law on the Use of Force in Outer Space,
29 J. Space L. 93-119 (2003). Nonetheless, despite the correctness of Professor
Lee's argument, it must be noted that from a practical perspective, given the
voting history of certain Security Council members such as Russia, France, and
China within both the UNGA and the Conference on Disarmament (CD), con-
cerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the probability is to say
the least weak, that the UNSC would override the OST restrictions on space mili-
tary activities.
26 Id. art. 25.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. art. 51.
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tainty or imminence of such an attack, could be in the national
interest of the United States, or of its allies."' The applicability
of such a right in space can only destabilize the delicate geopo-
litical balance. Thus, expansive interpretation of the U.N. Char-
ter, which would justify such actions in space, should be
discouraged. It is also important to note that, unlike Articles 39,
41 and 42 of the U.N. Charter, Article 51 rights are subject to a
condition-precedent of an armed attack, or at least an imminent
armed attack for anticipatory self-defense:"
Specific military activities are explicitly prohibited in outer
space. Article IV of the OST codifies these restrictions through
the establishment of a formal undertaking by States not to
"place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear
weapons or any kind of weapon of mass destruction, install such
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer
space in any other manner." It is important to note that Article
IV does not ban the technology to "place in orbit," "install," or
"station" such weapons,32 but only bans the act of doing so. Fur-
thermore, Article IV suffers from definitional lacunae. The
terms "nuclear weapon" and "weapons of mass destruction" are
not defined. The technological evolution in space weaponry has
created an interpretative polemic surrounding the interpreta-
tion of these terms.
Publicists, U.N. documents and State-practice all appear to
constantly interpret the term "weapons of mass destruction" to
include biological, radiological, and chemical weapons.3 3 How-
30 Henderson, supra note 18, at 10.
31 U.N. CHARrER art. 51.
32 OST, supra note 8, art. IV. This normative lacuna was to be addressed be-
tween the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. later in the SALT H and START"I treaties.
33 According to Professor Gorove:
While there is no indication in the treaty as to how many people
must be affected to constitute a weapon of mass destruction, a
group of 20 to 30 or less probably would constitute such a mass. If
on the other hand, bacteriological and chemical weapons were to
be used, even against a small group, then these weapons would
seem to fall under the category of weapons of mass destruction.
Stephen Gorove, Arm Control Provisions in the Outer Space Treaty: A Scrutinizing
Reappraisal, 3 GA.J. INT'Il & CoMp. L. 114, 115-16 (1973); Robert Bridge writes
that "[t]he generally accepted view is that weapons of mass destruction include
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons." Bridge, supra note 6. The United
Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments, resolved that "[w]eapons of
mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosive weapons, radio-
active material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons and any weap-
ons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive
effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above." G.A.
2005]
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ever, uncertainty has been expressed within doctrinal works as
to how the term "weapons of mass destruction" applies to the
new technologies involved in space weaponry. 4
Furthermore, although publicists generally agree on the ap-
plicability of the term to nuclear weapons in the classical sense,
a doctrinal polemic also subsists concerning the applicability of
the term to weapons which simply use nuclear power to gener-
ate their effects. 5
On another issue, according to OST Article IV (2), the "moon
and other celestial bodies shall be used by all states parties ex-
clusively for peaceful purposes." 6 Furthermore, Article IV (2)
forbids the "establishment of military bases and installations, the
testing of any kind of weapons, and the conduct of military ma-
neuvers on the moon and other celestial bodies." Furthermore,
the OST does not consider planet Earth as a celestial body.
Res. 18.8.48, U.N. GAOR, at 32, U.N. S/C.Doc. 3/32/Rev.1. (1948). However,
on commenting the U.N. document Professor Bin Cheng offers a caveat, writing
that "it should however be remembered that this was only a working definition
and recommendation, and cannot be regarded as a binding definition of the
expression under general international law, and still less an authoritative or au-
thentic interpretation of the 1967 Space Treaty." BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL SPACE LAw 530 (Clarendon Press 1997) [hereinafter CHENG STUDIES]; see
also W.T. Mallison, The Laws of War and the Juridical Control of Weapons of Mass
Destruction in General and Limited Wars, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 308 (1967).
34 On the issue of sophisticated weapons Nandasiri Jasentuliyana comments:
It would appear that Article IV does not prohibit laser and other
directed-energy weapons that are discriminate in character. These
weapons have very narrow and precisely directed beams to attack
very specific targets, such as ballistic missiles in flight, and therefore
are not weapons of mass destruction. While this argument may
hold true for the laser and particle-beam weapons and small hom-
ing devices currently being studied as components of space-based
BMD systems, there is disagreement as to its applicability to x-ray
lasers, an important element of some of the plans for ballistic mis-
sile defence.
JASENTULIVANA, supra note 6, at 104. It is interesting to note that during the hear-
ings on the OST at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then-Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance stated, when questioned by Senator Cooper on
the meaning of weapons of mass destruction, "I believe it would include such
other weapons system as chemical and biological weapons, sir, or any weapon
which might be developed in the future which would have the capability of mass
destruction such as that which would be wreaked by nuclear weapons." See
Bridge, supra note 6, at 656.
35 JASENTUL1YANA, supra note 6, at 104. Concerning the use of nuclear weap-
ons, see also Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear
Weapons, Res. 1653 (XVI), U.N. GAOR (1961).
36 OST, supra note 8, art. IV (2).
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According to the OST, State Parties are required to undertake
appropriate international consultation before proceeding with
any activity or experiment should the State Party have reason to
believe that such activity or experiment which is to be carried on
in outer space by the State of its nationals would cause poten-
tially "harmful interference" with the "peaceful exploration and
use" of outer space by other State Parties. 7 The term "harmful
interference" is not defined in the OST. Could the term "harm-
ful interference" be interpreted to encompass space weapons?
Such an expansive interpretation of the term would most proba-
bly be considered incorrect, as the limitation of space weaponry
is specifically dealt with in Article IV. In accordance with a "lo-
tus" type analysis, space-capable weaponry is not specifically pro-
hibited in Article IX and a fundamental premise of
international law is that what is not specifically prohibited is per-
mitted." Could the term be interpreted as covering belligerent
rights and the effect of space weapons? Although the term "ac-
tivity" can, from a grammatical perspective, be interpreted as en-
compassing belligerent rights, such an interpretation would
most probably be considered as jejune, as the OST was not meant
to change the law governing the means and methods of warfare.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to argue, and most would probably
agree, that the term could encompass effects that may result
from the testing of space weapons in outer space. Thus, should
a State Party have "reason to believe" that the testing of such
weapons "would cause potentially harmful interference," the
State Party would likely have to undertake appropriate interna-
tional consultations before proceeding with the tests. 9 How-
ever, because the concept of "harmful interference" is not
defined, states have somewhat of discretionary latitude in their
actions. It can also be cogently argued that the obligation to
proceed with consultations presupposes a reciprocal duty to co-
operate on the part of the affected State Party. At the very least,
the affected State Party likely has, to a degree, a duty to respond
to the consulting State Party. 40
The adjective "appropriate" further qualifies the "interna-
tional consultations" to be held.4" Thus, one may ask what are
37 Id. art. IX.
38 Steamship Lotus (France v. Turkey) P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10 (1927).
39 OST, supra note 8, art. IX.
40 Concerning the duty of response in negotiations, see North Sea Continental
Shelf, 1969 I.CJ. 3, at 47 (Feb. 20).
41 Id.
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"appropriate international consultations" when the discussion
concerns military activities?4 2 Military activities affecting na-
tional-security are usually shrouded with a penumbral veil of se-
crecy and discussed only with allies." The OST remains silent
on this issue. The OST does not require bilateral or multilateral
consultations; it also does not require all State Parties to the
OST be consulted, it is only the State Party whose space activites
are affected that must be consulted.4 4 Briefly stated, State Par-
ties are free to determine the form and manner of the consulta-
tions which remain an ad hoc process.
From a historical perspective, the duty to consult can be seen
as an attempt by the two two major Cold War protagonists to
improve communications in order to reduce international ten-
sion and the possibility of conflict. The duty to consult created a
regime of preventative diplomacy in outer space, and consider-
ing the importance of the space medium, must be exercised in
good faith.
Article IX of the OST is not the only dispute resolution mech-
anism applicable to outer space. Should Article IX preventative
diplomacy fail, State Parties remain bound through Article I of
the OST to seek a peaceful resolution to their dispute in accor-
dance with Article 2(3) and Chapter VI of the UN Charter. A
dispute in outer space may conceivably escalate. Should there
be a dispute in outer space, the continuance of which would
likely endanger the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity, the parties to the dispute, in accordance with Article 33
of the UN Charter would first of all have a duty to seek a solu-
tion by negotiation, inquiry,45 mediation, conciliation, or judi-
cial settlement. Should the mechanism of Article 33 of the UN
Charter fail to peacefully resolve the dispute, the institutional
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. Consultations in a bilateral setting are relatively easy to achieve. On the
otherhand, consultations in a multilateral environment should perhaps be insti-
tutionalized. It is also difficult to clearly determine the extent and respect of a
duty to consult. As one publicist astutely observed, "in the Lake Lanoux case the
tribunal noted that it is a delicate matter to decide whether such an obligation
(consultation) has been complied with .... If consultation is to be compulsory
... the circumstances in which the obligation arises, as well as the content need
careful definition, or allegations of failure to carry out the agreed procedure may
itself become a disputed issue." J.G. MERMLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLE-
MENT 6 (3d ed. 1998).
45 For inquiries, see THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND
1907 41 (J.B. Scott ed., 1915).
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responsibility of the UN vis-a-vis a space dispute could be initi-
ated. In accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter, the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) could decide to inves-
tigate any dispute or situation in outer space which might lead
to international friction or give rise to a dispute in order to de-
termine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security. Such an investigation by the UNSC likely would have a
binding effect upon the State Parties in accordance with Article
25 of the UN Charter. Furthermore, in accordance with the
"implied powers" doctrine, although less binding in effect, both
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the Secre-
tary General (SG) could also investigate.46
Lastly, it must be noted that a State Party which has "reason to
believe" that its peaceful use and exploration of outer space may
be subject to potentially harmful interference may request con-
sultation concerning the activity or experiment.4 7
Although the OST is a brilliantly written document, its silence
is equally conspicuous. In addition to its definitional taciturnity,
the OST never mentions space debris, which is an important is-
sue to space national-security.48 Nonetheless, the OST does con-
tain norms applicable to space debris, such as Article III in its
reference to "exploration" and "use," Article VII in reference to
state liability, Article VIII in reference to ownership of "compo-
nent parts," Article IX with "harmful interference," and, finally,
Article XI which calls upon the states to "inform the Secretary
General of the U.N." of "the nature, conduct, location and re-
sults" of its activities.49 Although not part of the OST, it is inter-
esting to note that the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Committee ("IADC"), a non-military international governmen-
tal forum, produces voluntary guidelines for the mitigation of
space debris.50
The concept of "peaceful purposes" is one of the most impor-
tant principles established within the OST.5 1 It is also a concept
46 See Simma, supra note 16, at 515.
47 Id.
48 OST, supra note 8.
49 Id. arts. III, VII, VIII, IX, XI.
50 Inter-Agency Space Coordination Committee, IADC Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines (Oct. 15, 2002), at http://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item=docs-
pub (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
51 From a historical perspective, McDougall notes that President Eisenhower
was one of the first and highest officials to use the expression "peaceful" to mean
"non-military." In a letter sent to the Soviet Premier, President Eisenhower pro-
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that has been besieged by a multi-dimensional interpretative po-
lemic. The interpretative problem with the expression "peace-
ful purposes" lies in the fact that the expression is only found in
the text of the treaty in Article IV as it relates to the moon and
other celestial bodies, and that it is only referred to otherwise in
the preamble of the OST. The first dimension of the polemic
lies in the interpretative scope that is to be applied, namely,
whether an expansive or a restrictive interpretation is to be
given to Article IV. Under a restrictive interpretation, the con-
cept of "peaceful purposes" would only be applicable to the
moon and other celestial bodies and not to "outer space. '5 2 On
the other hand, an expansive interpretation would enlarge the
scope of "peaceful purposes" to apply to outer space. The prac-
tice of States indicates that an expansive interpretation is to be
applied.53 The second dimension of the interpretative polemic
lies in the meaning of "peaceful purposes." Within this second
interpretative dimension, the point at issue is whether the adjec-
tive "peaceful" describes the means or the ends sought by the
space activity.54 The practice of States indicates that the adjec-
posed that the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. "agree that outer space should be used only
for peaceful purposes... Both Soviet Union and the United States are now using
outer space for the testing of missiles designed for military purposes. The time to
stop is now." McDougall then argues that "[t]his statement rather clearly implies
from its reference to the 'testing of missiles designed for military purposes,' that
Mr. Eisenhower was using the term 'peaceful' in supposed contradistinction to
'military uses' of space." See MVREs S. McDoUGAL ET. AL., LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER
IN SPACE 395 (Yale University Press 1963).
52 Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of Commercial Satellites: A New Look at the Outer
Space Treaty and "Peaceful Purposes," 60J. AIR L. & CoM. 237, 239 (1994).
53 See GENNADY ZHUKOV & YURI KOLOSOV, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 53
(Praeger 1984) (arguing that the Outer Space Treaty requires "total neutraliza-
tion and demilitarization of celestial bodies and [only] partial demilitarization of
outer space").
54 See Ivan A. Vlasic, The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, in PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION
FOR THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE 37, 39 (Taylor & Francis 1991) (indicating
that Soviet publicists preferred to interpret "peaceful" as meaning "non military,"
and that they had never deviated from this argument. C.Q. Christol provides an
excellent description of the drafting history of the OST with the possible inter-
pretations of "peaceful purposes" and the various proposals of the U.S.A. and
U.S.S.R. See CARL QUIMBY CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 22-26 (Pergamon Press 1982). Professor Christol also cogently asserts that
Article IV of the OST "did not invalidate the inherent right of national self-de-
fense pursuant to customary international law and Article 51 of the U.N. Char-
ter." Id. Professor Bin Cheng has critically analyzed the interpretation of
"peaceful" as meaning non aggressive. See Bin Cheng, The Legal Status of Outer
Space and Relevant Issues: Delimitation of Outer Space and Definition of Peaceful Use," 11
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tive "peaceful" qualifyies as the ends sought rather than the
means used, thus referring to non-aggression.55 In concluding
J. SPACE L. 89, 104 (1983) (stating that "'aggressive' acts are contrary to interna-
tional law and the Charter of the United Nations, particularly Article 2(4) of the
Charter, not only on the moon . . . but also anywhere in the universe .... [and]
would therefore, be prohibited in outer space as a whole."). See also CHENG STUD-
IES, supra note 33. See alsoJASENTULIYANA, supra note 6, at 104 (stating that the
OST "...left open the possibility of the placing in outer space of weapons other
than nuclear weapons and ... chemical and biological weapons. The gap thus
left has recently acquired practical importance in view of the development of
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and research into directed-energy weapons... ei-
ther for anti-satellite purposes or for ballistic missile defence."). See also G. Laffer-
anderie, La notion d'utilisation pacifique dans le droit de l'espace Rev. fr. dr. afrien
427 (1985).
55 From a historical perspective, the U.S. has consistently asserted that "peace-
ful" means "non-aggressive." The U.S.S.R. had also initially argued that the use
of surveillance satellites was an aggressive use of outer space. Surveillance satel-
lites were viewed by the U.S. as non-aggressive. Verification in future treaties,
such as SALT and the ABM Treaty, settled this dispute, establishing the legiti-
macy of surveillance satellites through the concept of "national technical means."
See Bridge, supra note 6, at 658-60. For an excellent review of certain U.S. military
spy flights, such as the U-2 incidents, or the RB-47 and their implications in inter-
national law, see CHENG STUDIES supra note 33, at 577. See also Michel Bourbon-
niere, Espionage and Overhead Imagery, 8 CARIBBEAN L. REV. 287 (1998).
Furthermore, the U.S. position is clearly stated in the National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958, which established U.S. policy in these terms: "The Congress
hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States that activities in space
shall be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2451 (a) (1988). In addressing Congress on the establishment of NASA, Presi-
dent Eisenhower stated that the "concern of our Nation that outer space be de-
voted to peaceful and scientific purposes." See Walter D. Reed & Robert W.
Norris, Militay Use of the Space Shuttle 13 AKRON L. REv. 665, 674 (1979). Reed
and Norris further cite the May 11, 1978, Presidential Directive establishing U.S.
space policies, wherein President Carter stated the U.S. "is committed to the ex-
ploration of outer space for peaceful purposes and the benefit of all mankind."
The Directive also provided that the U.S. will use space for self-defense and to
support certain military uses. See also P.G. Dembling, The Evolution of the Outer
Space Treaty 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 419, 434 (1967). Dembling argues that "any
military use of outer space must be restricted to non-aggressive purposes in view
of Article III, which makes applicable international law including the Charter of
the United Nations." China's position on interpreting the OST is as follows:
According to the 1967 [OST], outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation
by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means. States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in
orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons
on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any
other manner. The establishment of military bases, installations
and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons, and the con-
duct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies is forbidden.
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the section dealing with the OST, it is important to note that the
OST has received wide accession by the international
community.56
The Registration Convention 57 codifies a practice of record-
ing space objects launched into earth orbit or beyond. The
See Nuclear Threat Initiative, Letter from the Permanent representative of China
to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-General of the
Conference transmitting a Working Paper entitled "China's Position on and Sugges-
tions for ways to address the Issue of Prevention of an Arms race in Outer Space at the
Conference on Disarmament' (Feb. 9, 2000), available at http://www.nti.org/db/
china/engdocs/cparoswp.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2005). Alexander Yakov-
enko, the Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recently
stated that
Indeed, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty did ban placing all the kinds
of WMDs in space and on celestial bodies, but today there are no
legal barriers whatsoever to the placement in orbit round the Earth
of any other weapons... It goes without saying that "military" outer
space has a right to exist to the extent that it serves the aim of
maintaining and consolidating strategic stability and is being used
in the first place as an instrument ensuring a reduced nuclear war
risk and control over the implementation of disarmament agree-
ments. We, naturally, take into account the circumstance that
space technology achievements are being actively used for auxiliary
military purposes such as communication, navigation, and global
positioning systems. But this does not at all mean that military ac-
tivities in space should be used for the achievement of force
superiority.
Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Interview
with Alexander Yakovenko by Interfax (July 3, 2002), available at http://www.ln.
mid. ru / brp_4. nsf/ 0 / 64579c1 13723652b43256beb00522a2e? OpenDocument
(last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
56 It has been argued that the following principles, which originate from the
OST, have been so widely accepted that they are generally regarded as constitut-
ing binding customary international law, even for non-parties to these
agreements:
1) Space is free for exploration and use by all nations. It is not
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, use,
occupation, or any other means;
2) Activities in space shall be conducted with due regard for the
interests of other states;
3) Space activities are subject to general principles of international
law, including the U.N. Charter. '
See U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, An Assessment of
International Legal Issues in Information Operations (May 1999) (unpublished).
57 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,Jan.
14, 1975, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15, 28 U.S.T. No. 8480. CTS 1976/36, T.I.A.S. 8480
[hereinafter Registration Convention]. According to the Report of the Legal
Subcommittee, supra note 8, the Registration Convention had forty-four State
Parties and had been signed by an additional four States.
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practice was initially established in a 1961 UNGA resolution.
Registration is done with the Secretary General of the United
Nations who maintains such a register.5' The registry records
indicate the launching State or States, the appropriate designa-
tor of the space object or its registration number, the date and
territory or location of launch, basic orbital parameters, and the
general function of the space object." States enjoy a great deal
of latitude as to the timing of the registration, which is to be
completed "to the greatest extent feasible and as soon as practi-
cable." This latitude in the timing of the registration is useful
for certain military or classified satellites. Article 111(2) ensures
the public accessibility to these records, requiring "full and
open access in this Register." Furthermore, launching states
must also maintain a national registry of space objects launched
into earth orbit or beyond.6 The practice of having launching
states register foreign payloads has been mixed.62 In an effort to
clarify the practice, and believing that states should implement
their obligations under the convention, the United States State
Department does not register payloads either owned or con-
trolled by another State's private or governmental entities, and
launched from U.S. territory.6
The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space ("Rescue Agreement") articulates within its preamble the
duty of States for the "rendering of all possible assistance to as-
tronauts in the event of accident, distress or emergency landing,
the prompt and safe return of astronauts, and the return of ob-
jects launched into outer space. '"64
Given the nature of the obligations established within the Res-
cue Agreement, its application between belligerents is problem-
58 U.N. Res. 1721, U.N. GAOR (XVI) B. Establishing the United Nations Regis-
try of Launchings (adopted Dec. 20, 1961).
59 Registration Convention, supra note 57, art. IV.
60 These are the nodal period, inclination, apogee, and perigee of the orbit.
61 Registration Convention, supra note 57, art. II.
62 United States Criteria for the Registration of Space Objects (Nov. 2002), (on
file with author).
63 In the case of a non-U.S. payload, the owner/operator should ensure that its
payload is included on the registry of a state party to the convention other than
the United States.
64 Agreement on Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Re-
turn of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, T.I.A.S. 6599, CTS
1975/6 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement]. According to the Report of the Legal
Subcommittee, supra note 8, the Rescue Agreement had eighty-eight State Parties
and had been signed by twenty-five additional States.
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atic. Perhaps the easiest solution to the conundrum of applying
the Rescue Agreement between belligerents is simply the sus-
pension of the Rescue Agreement between belligerents. On an-
other level, it can be cogently argued that, during an
international armed conflict, the Rescue Agreement is bifur-
cated along a functional line." Under a functional interpreta-
tion, the Rescue Agreement can be seen as applicable to civil
space activities but not to military actors or to civilians who ac-
tively take part in hostilities. Thus, the Rescue Agreement
would not affect belligerent rights. In other words, the Rescue
Agreement would not impinge upon the rights of a belligerent,
such as the right to capture space assets or astronauts, nor would
it affect the status of prisoners of war as defined in the Geneva
Conventions, or the belligerent right of angary.6 6 The right of
angary is defined as "a right of belligerents to destroy, or use in
case of necessity, for its purpose of offense and defense, neutral
property on their territory, or on enemy territory, or on the
open sea. ' 67 Considering the applicability of the right of angary
on the "open sea," the right of angary could certainly be in-
voked in outer space, which has a similar legal status to that of
the high seas.
Article 2 of the Rescue Agreement stipulates that if "owing to
accident, distress, emergency or unintended landing, the per-
sonnel of a spacecraft land in territory under the jurisdiction of
a Contracting Party, it shall immediately take all possible steps to
rescue them and render them all necessary assistance." 6 Fur-
thermore, in case of such event, the Contracting Party must no-
tify both the launching authority and the Secretary General of
the United Nations of the steps it is undertaking and its pro-
gress. The Launching Authority is also required to assist in
these matters.
In cases occurring on the high seas, or in any other place not
under the jurisdiction of any State, those Contracting Parties
that are in a position to extend assistance shall do so. The assist-
ing Contracting Parties must also inform both the launching au-
65 Rescue Agreement, supra note 64.
66 Id.
67 OPPENHEIMER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 365 (David McKay Co. Inc. 1958); see
JAMES MOLONY SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 463-65 (Longmans, Green &
Co. ed., 1924) (arguing that "[t]he right can only be exercised in face of an
absolute necessity for the use of the neutral property for the belligerent's pur-
poses, and in all cases the neutral owner must be fully indemnified").
68 Rescue Agreement, supra note 64, art. 2.
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thority and the Secretary General of the United Nations of their
efforts and progress. Upon the request of the launching author-
ity, objects launched into outer space or their components must
be returned.6" Expenses are to be borne by the launching
authority.
A further parsing and deconstruction of Article 2 of the Res-
cue Agreement reveals additional arguments supporting the ap-
plicability of the functional bifurcation interpretation premise.
Within the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "accident" is
an unfortunate incident, which happens unexpectedly and un-
intentionally by chance, or without apparent cause. Similarly,
the term "distress" is the state of being in a dangerous situation
or circumstance resulting from a technical malfunction or "acci-
dent."7 It can be argued that both of these terms, by definition,
exclude incidents or situations that result from the deliberate
and legitimate exercise of a belligerent right, such as the target-
ing and shoot-down of a satellite or spacecraft. The scope of the
Rescue Agreement can thus be reasonably limited to civil "acci-
dent, distress, emergency or unintended landing' rather than
military objectives.
It can also be proffered that the Rescue Agreement does not
negate the right of an astronaut to ask for asylum. Should an
astronaut request asylum, elementary considerations of human-
ity should prevail over the treaty obligation to return the astro-
naut to the launching authority."'
The Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects7 2 establishes a normative regime for
state liability pertaining to national activities in outer space. Ar-
ticle I limits the possible damages recoverable under this treaty
to damages for "loss of life, personal injury or other impairment
of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of per-
sons, natural or juridical or property of intergovernmental orga-
69 Id. art. 5.
70 Id.
71 Corfu Channel Case (Merit's), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9, 1949). It is to be noted
that elementary considerations of humanity are more stringent in peace time
than during times of international armed conflict.
72 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Sept. 1, 1972, U.N.T.S. 187, Can. T.S. 1975 No. 7, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No.
7762. [hereinafter Liability Convention]. According to the Report of the Legal
Subcommittee, supra note 8, as of Jan. 1, 2003, the Liability Convention had
eighty-one State Parties and had been signed by twenty-six additional States.
2005]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN COMMERCE
nizations."73 It is important to note that economic damages,
such as loss of revenue, are not recoverable.
Article II codifies a regime of strict liability, stating that "[a]
launching State is absolutely liable to pay compensation for
damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or
to aircraft in flight."74
Article III codifies a liability regime based on fault or negli-
gence, stating that "[i] n the event of damage being caused else-
where than on the surface of the earth to a space object of one
launching State, or to persons or property on board such a
space object by a space object of another launching State, the
latter shall be liable only if damage is due to its fault or the fault
of persons for whom it is responsible."75
Article V creates joint and several liability in the case where
two or more states jointly participate in the launching of the
space object.7 6 Article VI establishes a possible exoneration
from the absolute liability, should there be gross negligence, or
from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage on
the part of the Claimant State.77 Furthermore, Article VI pre-
vents exoneration from liability, should the damage result from
activities which are not in conformity with international law, in-
cluding the U.N. Charter and the OST.
The applicability of the Liability Convention between belliger-
ents is also problematic. During an international armed con-
flict, a belligerent does not pay compensation for damages
caused by legitimate military objectives. It can be argued that
the Liability Convention is incompatible with the exercise of bel-
ligerent rights and would most probably be considered sus-
pended between belligerents. The scope of applicability of the
Liability Convention to damages caused by legitimate military
operations to space assets belonging to neutral states is a com-
plex issue and remains debatable. On this issue, it is important
to note that the exonerations outlined in the Liability Conven-
tion are not exhaustive and do not preclude a state from invok-
ing generally-accepted defenses, or excuses from liability, such
as consent, self-defense, counter-measures, force majeure, dis-
tress and necessity. The liability concerning the erroneous
73 Id.
74 Liability Convention, supra note 72, art. II.
75 Id. art. III.
76 Id. art. V.
77 Id. art. VI.
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targeting of a satellite under the jurisdiction and control of a
neutral State remains a complex issue. In the past, States have
paid compensation for erroneously targeting assets of a neutral
state." However, State practice on this matter appears to lack
the necessary opinion juris to create a legal obligation to pay
damages. The practice appears to be one more of comity."y
The evolution in the use of outer space, in both the commer-
cial sector and the military sector, is also challenging the liability
structure of this convention. For example, in dealing with con-
cerns on the commercial use of GPS signals, legal publicists do
not agree on the applicability of the Liability Convention to avia-
tion accidents caused by erroneous satellite navigation signals.8s
78 See Roman Boed, State of Necessity as a Justification for Intentionally Wrongful
Conduct, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2000) (noting that the defense of neces-
sity "does not necessarily protect the State from being asked to make compensa-
tion for the injurious consequences of its action").
79 See Articles 20-25 of the ILC's Articles of State Responsibility. In the case con-
cerning the Gabeikovovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk), 1997 I.C.J. 92
(Sept. 25, 1997), Article 33 of ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility was said
to reflect customary international law. Commenting on state liability, Louis
Henken stated, "[a] lawful measure of self defense may also involve conduct con-
trary to an international obligation. If self-defense is in accord with the U.N.
Charter, it would preclude a finding of wrongfulness." Louis HENKEN ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, 566 (West Group 3d ed., 1998). See
also The International Commission of Inquiry Between Great Britain and Russia Arising
of the Norts Sea Incident, 2 AM. J. INT. L. 929 (1908) (describing how Russian war-
ships erroneously targeted British fishing vessels, mistakenly believing them to be
Japanese Torpedo boats). The Commission did not find any wrongfulness on the
part of the Russian Admiral. Nonetheless, the Russian Government paid dam-
ages of $300,000.00. See THE HAGUE COURT REPORTS, [lst]-Series 403 (James
Brown Scott ed., Oxford University Press 1916). The defense of necessity poses
problems when compared to international humanitarian law, or the law of armed
conflict. Professor Marco Sassoli cogently points out that the defenses or excuses
cannot preclude the wrongfulness of a violation of peremptory norms of interna-
tional law, and that law of armed conflict is considered to be peremptory. Marco
Sassoli, State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 84 ICRC
401, 413 (2002). More specifically, on the liability of states in outer space,
Jonathan Epstein comments that "[w]hile essentially establishing strict liability
for the launching state, neither the convention language, deliberations on the
treaty, or commentators indicate that this convention was meant to cover any-
thing other than direct physical damage at the earth's surface caused by a mal-
functioning launch vehicle." Jonathan M. Epstein, Comment, Global Positioning
System (GPS): Defining the Legal Issues of its Expanding Civil Use, 61 J. AIR L. & COM.
243, 285 (1995).
so See Stephen Gorove, Some Comments on the Convention on International Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH COLLOQUIUM
ON THE LAW OF OU TER SPACE (U.C. Davis School of Law ed., 1973) (indirect dam-
ages were intentionally omitted from the recovery scheme and are therefore not
covered); Jiefang Huang, Development of the Long-term Legal Framework for the Global
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It is to be noted that the only incident invoking the Liability
Convention was the Cosmos 954 incident, where a Soviet satel-
lite crashed in the Canadian north."' Finally, the question can
be raised as to the applicability of the Liability Convention to an
act of aggression in outer space, which is necessarily in violation
of the U.N. Charter, and a violation of the peaceful purposes
principle.8 2
Navigation Satellite System, 22 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 585, 586 (1997). For the oppos-
ing view, see Paul B. Larsen, Legal Liability for Global Navigation Satellite Systems, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 12
(U.C. Davis School of Law ed., 1993).
81 On Jan. 24, 1978, Cosmos 954, a Soviet nuclear-powered maritime surveil-
lance satellite, crashed in the Northwest Territories of Canada. The satellite had
been launched into space on Sept. 18, 1977. The Secretary General of the
United Nations had been officially informed of the launch on November 22,
1977. See U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/INF.368 (1997). The U.S.S.R. had failed to
give Canada notice of the possible re-entry of the satellite into the earth's atmos-
phere Canadian territory, and, subsequently, of the imminent re-entry of the sat-
ellite. The crash scattered a large amount of radioactive debris over a 124,000-
square-kilometer area in northern Canada, stretching southward from Great
Slave Lake into northern Alberta and Saskatchewan. The government of Canada
informed the Secretary General of the United Nations of the discovery of debris
from the satellite. See U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/214 & 214/Corr.1 (Feb. 8, 1978);
A/AC.105/217 (Mar. 6, 1978); A/AC.105/236 (Dec. 22, 1978). The intrusion of
Cosmos 954 into Canada's air space, and the dispersion of hazardous radioactive
debris from the satellite on Canadian territory were considered by Canada viola-
tions of its sovereignty. Canada established this violation by the mere fact of the
trespass of the satellite within its airspace, the harmful consequences of this intru-
sion. International precedents recognize that a violation of sovereignty gives rise
to an obligation to pay compensation. See Canada v. U.S.S.R. (1979), 18 Int. Leg.
Mat. 899; see also National Space Development Agency of Japan, Settlement of Claim be-
tween Canada and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Damage Caused by "Cosmos
954" (Apr. 2, 1981), at http://www.nasda.go.jp/lib/space-law/chapter_3/3-2-2-
1_e.html. The claim was settled in the following way:
Negotiations towards a settlement did not begin for almost a year.
Finally after three sessions in February, June, and November 1980,
a three million dollar settlement that did not expressly acknowl-
edge legal liability was concluded in Moscow on April 2, 1981. It
took the form of a protocol signed by the Canadian Ambassador
and the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.
HUGH M. KINDRED ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND AP-
PLIED IN CANADA, 530 (Edmond Montgomery 5th. ed., 1993); see also P. G.
Dembling, Cosmos 954 and the Space Treaties 6 J. SPACE L. 29 (1978); Stephen
Gorove, Cosmos 954; Issues of Law and Policy 6J. SPACE L. 137 (1978); B. Schwartz
and M.L. Berlin, After the Fall: An Analysis of the Canadian Legal Claims for Damages
Caused by Cosmos 954, 27 McGILL L.J. 676 (1982).
82 See Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, U.N. Res. 3314 (XXIX) (1974),
G.A.O.R. 29th Sess., Supp. 31, at 42 ("Aggression is the use of armed force by a
State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of an-
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The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies is the least important of the
major space treaties and has not received wide accession within
the international community."3 Under this treaty, the moon is
to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Under Article 3.2,
"any threat or use of force or any other hostile act or threat of
hostile act on the moon is prohibited. It is likewise prohibited
to use the moon in order to commit any such act or to engage in
any such threat in relation to the earth, the moon, spacecraft,"
and "the personnel of spacecraft or man-made space-objects."84
Furthermore, Article 3.3 explicitly prohibits weaponizing the
moon, stating: "State Parties shall not place in orbit around, or
other trajectory to or around the moon objects carrying nuclear
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or
place or use such weapons on or in the moon.""5 Under Article
3.4, "the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifi-
cations, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of
military maneuvers on the moon" is prohibited. 6
b. Confidence Building Treaties
Considering the strategic importance of outer space and the
immense destructive capacity of weapons that use space technol-
ogy, the two major space powers negotiated a series of treaties
affecting the use of military space technology.8 7 T hese treaties
are primarily aimed at reducing international tensions between
the two major space powers. These are treaties that may either
increase transparency of action, or regulate arsenals through
arms control or arms reductions.
i. Increased Transparency
The two major space powers entered into a series of treaties in
order to increase transparency and predictability concerning
other State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations, as set out in this definition.").
83 Agreement on the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies, Dec. 5, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1434 [hereinafter Moon Agreement]. According to
the Report of the Legal Subcommittee, supra note 8, as ofJan. 1, 2003, the Moon
Agreement had ten State Parties and had been signed by five additional States.
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the use of their military space assets. The commonality of these
treaties lies in the method used to attain this goal-improving
the communication between the Cold War protagonists. Cer-
tain treaties dealt with improving the communication systems,
while others established communication protocols. The num-
ber of these treaties highlights the importance that the major
Cold War actors placed on improved communications as a nec-
essary aspect of national space-security law and, consequently,
on international-security as a whole.
ii. Communication Infrastructures
The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 eloquently displayed
the importance of prompt, direct communication between Mos-
cow and Washington. In 1963 the superpowers signed a Hotline
Agreement and a Hotline Expansion Agreement.8 The system
was then improved with The Hotline Modernization Agreement
Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Measures To Improve the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R.
Direct Communications Link.8 9 SinceJanuary 1978, two satellite
communications circuits are operational. The original radio cir-
cuit established under the 1963 agreement has been terminated.
Nonetheless, the original 1963 wire telegraph circuit is main-
tained as a backup.90 The Russian federation is now the succes-
sor-state to the Soviet Union for this Agreement.
The Agreement between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers was also an important confi-
dence-building document concerning space-capable assets and
secure communications.9 ' Again, the Russian federation is the
88 See Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America
and the Union. of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a
Direct Communications Link, at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/hot
line.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2005); see also Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Expand the U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Direct Communications Link (Jul. 17, 1984), available at http://www.
state.gov/t/ac/trt/4786.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2005).
89 Agreement on Measures to Improve the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Direct Communica-
tions Link, 806 U.N.T.S. 402 (Sept. 30, 1971), available at http://www.state.gov/
t/ac/trt/4787.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
90 Id.
91 Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Establishment at Nuclear Reduction Centers (Sept. 15,
1987), available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/nrrc/docs/nrrcl.htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005).
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successor state to the Soviet Union for this Agreement. The
Agreement establishes within both Moscow and Washington a
National Risk Reduction Center (NRRC)Q 2 There are two pro-
tocols to this Agreement. The first protocol deals with the sub-
ject of notification, namely, ballistic missile launches required
under both Article 4 of the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Re-
duce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, and Article VI, para-
graph 1 of the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents
on and Over the High Seas." It is important to note that two
other Agreements also profit from the NRRCs, namely, the Bal-
listic Missile Launch Notification Agreement and the INF Treaty.94
Communication concerns between the two superpowers are
also addressed within the Memorandum of Agreement between
the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the
Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from
Early Warning Systems and Notifications of Missile Launches.
('JDEC-MOA") 95 The JDEC-MOA attempts to diminish the pos-
sible consequences resulting from a false missile attack. How-
ever, the stated purpose of the JDEC-MOA is twofold. First,
JDEC-MOA establishes "an uninterrupted exchange of informa-
tion on launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles
from the early warning systems of the two parties. ''9 6 Second,
and more ambitiously, the JDEC-MOA aims to be a precursor to
a "possible ... [future] multilateral regime for the exchange of
notifications of launches of ballistic missiles and 9pace launch
vehicles. '9 7 From a national-security law perspective, this agree-
ment is a significant milestone, as it established for the first time




94 Memorandum of Agreement between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Interconti-
nental Ballistic Missles and Submarines Launched Ballistic Missies, U.S.-Russia
(May 31, 1988), available at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4714.htm (last visited
Aug. 16, 2005).
95 Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of the United States
and Government of the Russian Federation on the Establishment of a Joint
Center for the Exchange of Data From Early Warning Systems and Notifications
of Missile Launches, U.S.-Russia (June 4, 2000), available at http://wwaA.state.
gov/t/ac/trt/4799.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2005) [hereinafter JDEC-MOA].
96 Id. art. 1.
97 Id.
98 Office of the Press Secretary (Moscow, Russia), The White House, U.S., Fact
Sheet-Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Warning Center for the Ex-
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Article 1 of the JDEC-MOA establishes in Moscow a joint
center for the exchange of data from early warning systems and
notifications of missile launches, also referred to as the 'Joint
Data Exchange Centre," or simply 'JDEC."'99 Ajoint commission
oversees the activities of the JDEC. Data is to be exchanged be-
tween the Parties concerning:
a. all launches of ICBMs and SLBMs of the United States of
America and the Russian Federation;
b. launches of ballistic missiles, that are not ICBMs or SLBMs, of
the United States of America and of the Russian Federation;
c. launches of ballistic missiles of third states that could pose a
direct threat to the Parties, or that could create an ambiguous
situation and lead to possible misinterpretation; and finally,
launches of space launch vehicles."' °
The data is to be supplied in possible real-time by space-based
and earth-based assets. 10 1 Should a ballistic missile launch be
detected, the information to be exchanged is the time of
launch, geographic generic missile class, geographic area of
payload impact, estimated time of payload impact and launch
azimuth. Should the launch of a space vehicle be detected, the
parties are to exchange: the time of launch, generic missile
class, geographic area of the launch, and launch azimuth.1 0 2 All
of this information is deemed to be of a confidential and sensi-
tive nature and may not be disclosed without the consent of the
other party.10 3
A space launch vehicle ("SLV") is defined as a rocket used for
delivering an object into orbit or outer space. 4 A spacecraft,
on the other hand, is a vehicle with special equipment and is
intended for flights into or in outer space for military, commer-
cial, economic, research, or scientific purposes.10 5 A ballistic
missile ("BM") is defined as a missile that has a ballistic trajec-
tory over most of its flight path, whether or not it is a weapon-
delivery system.' 06 For an SLBM to be reported, it must have a
change of Information on Missile Launches and Early Warning (June 4, 2000),
available at http://clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/summit504OOlaunch.htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005).
99 JDEC-MOA, supra note 95, art. 6.
100 Id. art. 3.
101 Id. art. 4.
102 Id. art. 5.
103 Id. art. 13.
104 Id. app. 1(a).
105 Id. app. 1(m).
106 Id. app. 1(b).
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range of more than 600 kilometers.'" An ICBM, however, is a
weapons delivery system with a range in excess of 5,500
kilometers."'
Concerned about the possible accidental outbreak of hostili-
ties, the superpowers signed the Agreement on Measures to Re-
duce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, °9 and the
Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nu-
clear War.' ' Under these agreements, the parties undertake to
notify each other immediately if missile warning systems detect
unidentified objects, or if there are signs of interference with
these systems or with communication facilities."' Each party
also undertakes to give the other advance notice of an intended
missile launch should the launch extend past its national bound-
aries in the direction of the other party."12 Both contracting
parties agree to act "to prevent the development of situations
capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations,
as to avoid military confrontations, and as to exclude the out-
break of nuclear war between them, and between either of
[them] and other countries."' 3 Although not specifically de-
signed to regulate space technology, this provision affects both
military space operations and critical space assets.
The United States and the U.S.S.R. also signed an agreement
concerning the prevention of dangerous military activities that
impacts peacetime space military activities." 4 Under the Pre-
vention of Dangerous Military Activities Agreement, parties may
create certain "Special Caution Areas."' 1 5 A Special Caution
Area is a region mutually designated by the parties in which
107 Id. app. 1(c).
108 Id. app. 1(d).
109 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 807 U.N.T.S. 57 (Sept. 30, 1971), available at http:// www.state.
gov/t/ac/trt/4692.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) [hereinafter AMRRONW].
110 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War, June 22, 1973, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 24 U.S.T. 1478, available at: http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5186.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
MH AMRRONW, supra note 109, art. 3.
112 Id. art. 4.
113 Id. art. 1.
114 Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, June 12,
1989, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 28 I.L.M. 877 [hereinafter the Prevention of Dangerous Mili-
tary Activities]. A similar agreement exists between China and Russia but not be-
tween China and the U.S.A.
115 Id. at 883.
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armed forces personnel and equipment of the parties are pre-
sent, and where the parties agree to take special measures." 6
Under Article II of the agreement, the parties undertake to pre-
vent certain dangerous activities, such as entering into the na-
tional territory of the other party, using a laser in such a manner
such that its radiation could cause harm to personnel or damage
equipment of the other party, or interfering with command and
control networks in a manner that could harm the personnel or
damage the equipment of the other party.117 In the event of
such occurrences, the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activi-
ties Agreement outlines certain communications protocols to re-
duce tensions and prevent a devastating escalation- of
hostilities.11 Article VIII of the Prevention of Dangerous Mili-
tary Agreement specifically states that the Agreement is not to
affect the rights of individual or collective self-defense, and of
navigation or over-flight, in accordance with international
law.1"9 To facilitate the execution of the agreement, ajoint Mili-
tary Commission is created under Article IX.' 20 The Prevention
of Dangerous Military Activities Agreement also completes be-
tween the Parties the Rescue Agreement in situations involving
military astronauts and equipment, which, during peacetime,
would enter the national territory of the other party.1 21 Article
IV of the Prevention of Dangerous Military Agreement refers to
certain procedures set forth in Annexes 1 and 2 of the Agree-
ment.' 22 In this case, military astronauts would be accorded the
opportunity to contact their defense attach6 as soon as possible;
the equipment would have to be cared for and protected, and
their departure facilitated at the earliest opportunity.1 21
Within the space national-security legal architecture, commu-
nication was primarily an issue of concern between the United
States and the former U.S.S.R. Communicative concerns were,
however, not exclusive to the bilateral relations of the superpow-
ers. A treaty was also signed between the United States and
China in an attempt to establish a better communication-inter-
116 Id. at 883-84.
117 Id. at 881.
11S Id. at 883.
119 Id. at 885.
120 Id. at 886.
121 Id. at 892.
122 Id. at 883.
123 Id. at 892.
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face between these two countries.'24 This is the Agreement Be-
tween the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People's
Republic of China Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to
Strengthen Military Maritime Safety. Although this Agreement
does not explicitly deal with space technology, it does apply to
ships equipped with space-capable technology, and thus has an
indirect impact on space national-security law.' 25
Under this agreement, the defense ministries of the respective
parties are to encourage and facilitate, as appropriate, consulta-
tions between delegations authorized by their respective defense
ministries "for the purpose of promoting common understand-
ings regarding activities undertaken by their respective maritime
and air forces when operating in accordance with international
law, including the principles and regimes reflected in the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." ' 6 The
mechanism is defined within Article II as "Annual meetings.1' 27
Lastly, it is important to note that the CFE treaty presents a tex-
tual evolution of the protective envelope as the protective envel-
ope within the CFE also includes multinational technical means.
The CFE protective envelope is, however, limited to verification
for ensuring compliance with the treaty. The question can also
be asked, in the case of the CFE, as to the possible inclusion of
private commercial satellite ventures within the protective envel-
ope of multinational technical means.
iii. Communication Protocols
In order to work efficiently, the communication infrastruc-
ture required an official procedure or system of rules. A series
of treaties established communication protocols on certain key
issues of space security.' The Agreement on Notification of an
124 Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of
America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China
on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime
Safety, Jan. 19, 1998, U.S.-China, at http://ww.fas.org/nuke/control/sea/test/
us-china98.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
125 Id. art. 2.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Department of State, U.S., Introduction to Agreement Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on Notifications of Launches of International Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-
Launched Ballistic Missiles, at http://www.state.gov/wvw/global/arm/treaties/
balistl.html [hereinafter Introduction to Launch Notification Agreement].
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Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Submarine-
Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) structured certain communi-
cation protocols concerning the important issue of launches of
nuclear-armed missiles. 129 This treaty was originally signed be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union. The Russian Fed-
eration is now the successor state for this agreement. Even
though a number of previous agreements dealt with the issue of
launch notification (1971 Accident Measures Agreement, the
1972 Incident at Sea Agreement, and Article XVI of SALT II), a
comprehensive treatment of strategic ballistic missile launch no-
tifications was nonetheless absent from the normative struc-
ture. 1 ° This Agreement addresses these lacunae and provides
further confidence-building measures through increased com-
munication. Each party agreed to provide notice to the other
party through their respective Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers,
no less than 24-hours in advance, of the planned date, launch
area, and area of impact of any launch of a strategic ballistic
missile, an intercontinental ballistic missile, or a submarine-
launched ballistic missile.1 31 In case of a rescheduling of such
launch, notice is deemed to be legally binding for a period of
four days.13 2 For ICBMs and SLBMs from land, the notification
shall additionally indicate the general area from which the
planned launch is to take place.' 3 3 For SLBMs launched from
submarines, the notification will also specify the quadrant of the
ocean or the body of water from which the launch is scheduled
to occur.
1 3 4
Another such treaty is the Agreement Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of In-
cidents On and Over the High Seas and its Protocol. 35 Again,
129 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of
Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic
Missiles, May 31, 1988, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 I.L.M. 1176, 1200, available at http://
www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/balistl.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005)
[hereinafter the Launch Notification Agreement].
130 Introduction to Launch Notification Agreement, supra note 128.
131 Id. at 1201, art.1.
132 Id. at 1201, art. II.
133 Id. at 1201, art III.
134 Id. at 1201-02, art. III.
135 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of
Incidents on and over the High Seas, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 1168 (May 25,
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the Russian Federation is the successor state for this agree-
ment.' The agreement defines the term "aircraft" and specifi-
cally excludes spacecraft from the term. 37 Nonetheless, the
agreement, which deals with incidents between military ships,
does have an implication for ships with space-capable technol-
ogy. Furthermore, the Protocol deals with exercising due re-
gard by military ships towards non-military ships and in this
sense can shed some light on the possible interpretation of the
due regard norm contained in Article IX of the OST."'
According to Article 111(6) of the Agreement, "Ships of the
Parties shall not simulate attacks by aiming guns, missile launch-
ers, torpedo tubes, and other weapons in the direction of a pass-
ing ship of the other Party, not launch any object in the
direction of passing ships of the other Party."' 39 Article VI of the
Agreement also establishes an obligation for the parties to
broadcast information and warnings to mariners at least three to
five days in advance of "notification of actions on the high seas
which represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in
flight."1 40 Article II of the Protocol states that the parties are not
to "make simulated attacks by aiming guns. Missile launchers,
torpedo tubes and other weapons at non-military ships of the
other Party, nor launch nor drop any objects near non-military
ships of the other Party in such a manner as to be hazardous to
these ships or to constitute a hazard to Navigation."'' 41 Should
space ever be weaponized, similar rules would need to be estab-
lished in outer space to ensure the security of both the exercise
of the right of peaceful navigation through space and the inter-
face between the air- and space-mediums.
1972), available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/sea/text/seal.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 1, 2005) [hereinafter PIHS].
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Protocol to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas signed May 25, 1972, U.S.S.R.,
24 U.S.T. 1063 (May 22, 1973), available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/
sea/text/seal.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
139 PIHS, supra note 135, art. 111(6).
140 Id. art. VI.
14 Id. art. III.
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iv. Regulation of Arsenals
Treaties regulate different aspects of space-capable arse-
nals, 1 42 ranging from the development and testing of new tech-
nologies to their production and deployment. 14  Perhaps the
first normative instrument concerning a military activity in outer
space was the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the At-
mosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 1963 ("LTBT").144
A formal undertaking of State Parties is found in LTBT, Article
I, to not "carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any
other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or
control: (a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including
outer space; or underwater, including territorial waters or high
seas."
145
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty "CTBT 146 continues
where the LTBT left off. Article I of the CTBT states: "Each
State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and
prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its juris-
diction or control."1 47 Of the major space-faring nations, the
142 For a fascinating account of the process from one of the main actors in the
negotiations of disarmament treaties, see THOMAS GRAHAM JR., DISARMAMENT
SKETCHES: THREE DECADES OF ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (Wash.
Univ. Press ed., 2002).
143 Id.
144 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space
and Under Water, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. 5433 (Aug. 5, 1963), available at
http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4797.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) [hereinafter
LTBT]. This Treaty was amended through the UN by the Amendment of the
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, A/RES/46/28, Dec. 6, 1991.
145 LTBT, supra note 144, art. I.
146 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-28
(not yet entered into force), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/
arms/treaties/ctb.heml (last visited Feb. 18, 2005) [hereinafter CTBT]. As of
2000, it has been signed by 170 countries and ratified by 109. Bureau of Arms
Control, U.S., Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Signatories/Ratifiers
(Nov. 15, 2000), at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/factsheets/wmd/
nuclear/ctbt/ctbtsigs.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Signatures to
the CTBT]. The latest signatory of the CTBT is Eritrea, and the latest ratifying
State is the Libyan Arabjamahiriya. Id. According to Article XIV, this Treaty will
enter into force 180 days after the forty-four States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty
have all ratified. Id. Currently, forty-one of these forty-four States have signed,
and the missing three are The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and
Pakistan. Id. From Annex 2, thirty-two States have ratified the Treaty. China and
the United States have both signed but not ratified the Treaty. Id.
147 CTBT, supra note 146, art. I.
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United Kingdom, France, and Russia have ratified the CTBT. 148
However, both the United States and China have not ratified the
CTBT. 14
9
It is important to note that LTBT prohibitions apply only to
nuclear explosions and not to other activities that result in the
release of nuclear energy.' 5 Some of these activities may be re-
quired in the management of nuclear weapons. Activities re-
lated to nuclear power research, including accelerators, are not
prohibited, and neither are preparations for nuclear weapons
tests.1 51 Only tests in and of themselves are prohibited.1 5 1
The prohibition does not prevent the use of space nuclear
weapons during armed conflict. 1 5' The Treaty does prohibit the
use of nuclear explosions for non-testing purposes at any place
under the jurisdiction or control of a State, but does not affect
UN Charter, Article 51 rights. 54 Furthermore, it is important to
note that the phrase "or any other nuclear explosion" is identi-
cal in the LTBT and CTBT.155 It is the position of the United
States that, in the LTBT, it was clearly understood that the
phrase would not apply to the use of nuclear weapons in the
event of war.'56 The negotiating records of the CTBT also
demonstrate that the prohibition in Article I does not apply to
the use of nuclear weapons, which, as is demonstrated in the
preamble, was beyond the scope of the Treaty.1 57
The control of nuclear weapons is an important aspect of
space national-security law. Attacks on space assets do not nec-
essarily require advanced space technology. The effects of a nu-
clear detonation either in outer space, or occurring within a
very high altitude, can cause havoc with space assets, effectively
destroying satellite constellations within the Low Earth Orbit
("LEO"). 5 8 Concerns of the international community over the
148 Signatures to the CTBT, supra note 146.
149 Id.






156 See Department of State, Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the At-
mosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, at http://www.state.gov/www/
global/arms/treaties/ltbtl.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
157 Id.
158 See generally Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Defense Threat Reduc-
tion Agency, High Altitude Nuclear Detonations (HAND) Against Low Earth Or-
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proliferation of nuclear weapons technology were addressed in
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
("NPT") ,5 which has been described as "the centerpiece of in-
ternational efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.'
160
The Treaty establishes as a Nuclear Weapons State, one that
had, before January 1, 1967, manufactured and detonated a nu-
clear weapon. 16' Five nuclear powers, the United States, the
United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China, have thus legiti-
mized their nuclear arsenals.1 62 The transfer of nuclear weap-
ons technology to any recipient, whatsoever, directly or
indirectly, is proscribed by the NPT. 163 Nuclear Weapons States
undertake to not transfer nuclear weapons technology.164 Re-
ciprocally, non-Nuclear Weapons States undertake to not re-
ceive or manufacture nuclear weapons. 6 5 In exchange for their
undertaking to not acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons,
States may receive assistance in the development of nuclear
power destined for peaceful uses. Furthermore, each of the par-
ties to the treaty, including the five Nuclear Weapons States,
agree to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective mea-
sures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general
and complete disarmament under strict and effective interna-
tional control." 16
6
Verification of compliance is achieved through the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA"), which in turn reports
noncompliance to both the United Nations Security Council
bit Satellites ("HALEOS"), at http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/
haleos.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). Several scenarios are exposed such as col-
lateral damages caused to LEO satellites from a regional conflict where a state
has fired a "nuclear warning shot" over another state, or a deliberate LEO attack
from a dictator as a final gesture of defiance towards the West. Id.
159 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/
arms/treaties/nptl.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) [hereinafter NPT].
160 Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., Bi-Partisan Task Force on Non-Prolifera-
tion, U.S. House of Representatives, at http://www.house.gov/markey/issnon
proliferation-grahamst0306l8.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
161 NPT, supra note 159, art. IX.
162 Department of State, Signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (Dec. 3, 1998), at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/
treaties/npt3.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
163 NPT, supra note 159, art. I-II.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. art. VI.
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("UNSC") and the United Nations General Assembly
("UNGA").' 67 Regrettably, North Korea withdrew from the NPT
in January 2003.68
Perhaps the most publicized treaties regulating space-capable
arsenals were the Anti-Ballistic Missile ("ABM") Treaty of 1972,
the Protocol of 1974, and the ABM Treaty Demarcation Agree-
ment 1977, which are no longer in force. 6 '
The ABM Treaty limited the deployment, testing, and use of
missile systems intended to intercept incoming strategic ballistic
missiles. 17" Article I defined an ABM system as "a system to
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight tra-
jectory."'71 Parties to the Treaty had decided to proscribe the
testing, development, deployment, and use of ABM systems. 172
The treaty initially allowed each Party to maintain two ABM sys-
tems having a radius of not more than 150 kilometers, with the
centers of the two deployment areas separated by a minimum of
1,300 kilometers. 171 In each of these deployment areas, a Party
could deploy a maximum of 100 ABM launchers with a maxi-
'7 See id. at pmbl.
168 See Larry A. Mksch, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division, North Ko-
rea's Nuclear Weapons Program (2003), at http://fas.org/spp/starwars/ors/
IB91141.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
169 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23
U.S.T. 3435 (May 26, 1972), available at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/
library/treaties/missle-defense/trty-missle-defense limitations_1972-05-26.htm
(last visited Aug. 16, 2005) [hereinafter ABM Treaty]; Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems Protocol to the Treat), of May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T.
1645 (July 3, 1974), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/hunianrts/peace/docs/
protocol1972.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005); First Agreed Statement Relating to
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems on May 26, 1972
(Sept. 26, 1997), at http://defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/abm/as-I.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005); Second Agreed Statement Relating to the Treaty be-
tween the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems on May 26, 1972 (Sept. 26,
1997), at http://www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/abm/as_2.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 1, 2005); ABM Treaty: Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures
Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other than Strategic Ballistic Mis-
siles (Sept. 24, 1997), at http://www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/abm/
cbm.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005); ABM Treaty: Regulations of the Standing
Consultative Commission (Sept. 26, 1997), at http://ww.defenselink.mil/acq/
acic/treaties/abm/adreg.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
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mum of 100 ABM interceptor missiles at the launch sites.'74 The
1974 Protocol modified this right, allowing each Party to main-
tain one ABM system located either in the surrounding area of
its national capital, or at an ICBM site. 75
Article V(1) of the Treaty stipulated: "each party undertakes
not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components
which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-
based.' 1 76 Nonetheless, research on ABM technology remained
permissible. The parties also agreed that, should an ABM sys-
tem based on other physical principles including components
capable of substituting for "ABM interceptor missiles, ABM
launchers, or ABM radars" be created, specific limitations on
such systems and their components would be subject to new dis-
cussion in accordance with Article XIII, and agreement in accor-
dance with Article XIV of the Treaty.1 77
Verification of treaty compliance was to be provided by the
use of "national technical means . . . consistent with generally
recognized principles of international law." The ABM Treaty
not only formally recognized the legitimate use of intelligence-
gathering satellites, but also protected these intelligence-gather-
ing satellites. 17 Both parties agreed not to interfere with each
other's national technical means of verification. 179 Each party also
undertook to not use deliberate concealment measures, which
could impede verification by national technical means.'80 None-
theless, this undertaking not to impede verification did not re-
quire changes in existing construction, assembly, conversion, or
overhaul practices.'
The ABM Treaty was to be besieged by an interpretative po-
lemic. There was considerable debate on expansive interpreta-
tions or restrictive interpretations of the Treaty regarding the
testing of certain ABM systems in space. 182 The dissolution of
174 Id.
175 Id. art. III.






182 See Abraham D. Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99
HARv. L. Rrv. 1972 (1986). For a review of the debate and a critique of the
reinterpretation, see RAYMOND GARTHOFF, POLICY VERSUS THE LAw: THE REiNTER-
PRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY (The Brookings Institution ed., 1986). For a
differing opinion, see PAUL NITZE, FROM HIROSHIMA TO GLASNOST: AT THE
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the U.S.S.R. created important issues concerning the successor
state for this treaty.1"' The dissolution of the U.S.S.R. was con-
firmed with the establishment of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States ("CIS"),'8 4 which attempted to become the
successor State to the U.S.S.R. This was, however, not to be the
case. Nor could the Russian Federation be recognized as the
sole successor State for the ABM Treaty. The geographical dis-
tribution of the Soviet's ABM system made it impossible for the
Russian Federation to be the sole successor state to the
U.S.S.R. 115 Establishing the Russian Federation as the successor
state to the U.S.S.R. would have created an unacceptable situa-
tion, placing the Russian Federation in immediate violation of
its ABM Treaty obligations.186 This succession problem was not
exclusive to the ABM Treaty. Similar issues confronted the In-
termediate Nuclear Force Treaty ("INF"), the Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty,'87 and the 1991 Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty ("START"). 1 8 The ABM Treaty was consid-
CENTER OF DECISION (Grove Weidenfeld ed., 1989); see also Abram Chayes & An-
tonia Handler Chayes, Testing and Development of Exotic Systems Under the ABM
Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper 99 HARV. L. REV. 1956 (1986); FRANCIS FITZ-
GERALD, WAY OUT THERE IN THE BLUE: REAGAN, STAR WARS, AND THE END OF THE
COLD WAR (Simon & Schuster ed., 2000). For a broader analysis of reinterpreta-
tion of arms control treaties, see David Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch:
Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353 (1989);
David A. Koplow, When Is an Amendment Not an Amendment? Modification of Arms
Control Agreements Without the Senate, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 981 (1992).
183 See Paul R. Williams, The Treaty Obligations of the Successor States of the Former
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia: Do They Continue in Force?, 23 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, (1994); see also Edwin D. Williamson &John E. Osborn, A U.S.
Perspective on Treaty Succession and Related Issues in the Wake of the Break-up of the
USSR and Yugoslavia, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 261 (1993).
184 Agreement Established the Commonwealth of Independent States, 31
I.L.M. 138 (Dec. 21, 1991) [hereinafter the Alma Alta Declaration].
185 State Department, Fact Sheet on Memorandum of Understanding on Suc-
cession (Sept. 26, 1997), at http://wwv.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/docs/
97092616_wpo.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). Certain early-warning radars,
along with an ABM test range, were located outside of the Russian Federation.
Id.
86 ABM Treaty, supra note 169. Specifically, Article IX of the ABM Treaty
states that "[t]o assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party
undertakes not to transfer to other States and not to deploy outside its national
territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty." Id. art. IX.
187 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 1
[hereinafter the CFE].
I8 These issues were resolved through a series of treaties, known as the Tash-
kent Agreement of 1992, allocating Soviet allotments under the CFE Treaty to
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Geor-
gia. Id. The Lisbon Protocol of 1992 names Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus, and
20051
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ered an important document to the strategic logic of the epoch.
Thus, the ABM Treaty was not allowed to lapse and continued in
force. 189 A Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") on the
issue of ABM Treaty succession was signed between the United
States, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Be-
larus. Within this MOU, the four former Soviet Republics as-
sumed the rights and obligations of the predecessor State in the
ABM treaty, and its associated documents.1 90 As a result of this
MOU, a bilateral treaty mutated into a multilateral existence.
The multilateralization of the ABM Treaty became an issue of
debate in Washington between the Senate and the Office of the
President.191
A perceived change by the United States in the strategic
threats environment in missile proliferation capabilities of
"rogue nations" sealed the fate of the ABM Treaty. 9 2 Thus, the
multilateral life of the ABM Treaty was quite short. On Decem-
ber 14, 2001, the U.S. State Department sent a diplomatic note
to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine stating:
Pursuant to Article XV, paragraph 2, the United States has de-
cided that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of
the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Therefore, in
Kazakhstan as the successors to the Soviet Union in the START I Treaty. Id. The
Ukraine and Belarus have also participated in the implementation of the INF
Treaty through agreements reached in the Treaty's Special Verification Commis-
sion (SVC). Id. The Senate did review the Lisbon Protocol when it offered its
advice and consent to the START I Treaty, but it did not request or receive an
opportunity to review the multilaterlization arrangements made for the INF and
CFE treaties. Id.
189 See William J. Clinton, Response by the President to the March 3 Letter
from Senators Gilman and Helms on the ABM Treaty, Coalition to Reduce Nu-
clear Dangers (May 21, 1998), at http://www.clw.org/archive/coalition/
clin0521.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2005).
190 Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limi-
tation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems on May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., at http://
www.defenselink.mil/acq/acic/treaties/abm/ad_mou.htm (last visited Mar. 1,
2005) [hereinafter the MOU].
191 The issue being that the Senate believed that the changing of a bilateral
treaty into a multilateral treaty constituted a "substantive modification to the
Treaty," thus requiring the advice and consent of the Senate. Walter Dellinger,
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S., Memorandum for the Counsel to the President,
Constitutionality of Legislative Provision Regarding ABM Treaty (1996), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/abmjq.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
192 Amy Woolf, Foreign Affairs Defense and Trade Division, National Missile
Defense Russia's Reaction (2002) at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/
RL30967.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2005). On this point, the Russians had a differ-
ent perspective on the threat assessment. Id.
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the exercise of the right to withdraw from the Treaty provided in
Article XV paragraph 2, the United States hereby gives notice of
its withdrawal from the Treaty. In accordance with the terms of
the Treaty, withdrawal will be effective six months from the date
of this notice.' 3
The decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty was based on
a perceived change to the international-security environment.
9 4
It was argued that the new security environment required a "dif-
ferent approach to deterrence and new tools for defense."' 95
The strategic logic of the Cold War was deemed not applicable
to the new threats.' 6 Russian President Vladimir Putin re-
sponded quickly to the American withdrawal. President Putin
stated that he believed the withdrawal was a mistake, but that
the American decision "[did] not pose a threat to the national-
security of the Russian Federation." 197 China was opposed and
expressed concerns about the American withdrawal.' 98
193 Id. at 5.
194 The White House, National-security Presidential Directive/NSPD-23 Memo-
randum (Dec. 16, 2002), at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd-23.htm (last
visited Feb. 18, 2005) [hereinafter NSPD-23]:
[A]s the events of September 11 demonstrated, the security envi-
ronment is more complex and less predictable than in the past. We
face growing threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in
the hands of states or non-state actors, threats that range from ter-
rorism to ballistic missiles intended to intimidate and coerce us by
holding the U.S. and our friends and allies hostage to WMD attack.
Hostile states, including those that support terrorism, are investing
large resources to develop and acquire ballistic missiles of increas-
ing range and sophistication that could be used against the United
States and our friends and allies. These same states have chemical,
biological, and/or nuclear weapons programs. In fact, one of the
factors that make long range ballistic missiles attractive as a delivery
vehicle for weapons of mass destruction is that the United States
and our allies lack effective defenses against this threat.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 President Vladimir Putin, Speech on U.S. Withdrawal From ABM Treaty
(December 14, 2001), at http://www.cdi.org/russia/ohnson/5597-1.cfm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005).
198 President Jiang Holds Phone Talks with Bush and Putin, Peoples Daily On-
line (Dec. 14, 2001), at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/2001/2/14/
eng20011214_86664.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue stated her government's concerns and those of the
international community, arguing that the United Nations General Assembly has
adopted a resolution calling for joint efforts to strengthen and preserve the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for three consecutive years. On November 29, the
United Nations General Assembly once again passed the resolution, which fully
demonstrated that the world hoped to keep the resolution and its function of
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Regrettably, the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Associated Doc-
uments ("SALT II") 199 never came into force. Under Article IX,
the Parties had agreed "not to develop, test or deploy . . .sys-
tems for placing into Earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other
kind of weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital
missiles. ' 20  Conceptually speaking, Article IX of SALT II com-
pleted Article IV of the OST. SALT II also contained an Elimi-
nation and Conversion Protocol consisting of two Sections. 20 1
The first Section established procedures for the elimination of
heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters.20 2 The second Section
established procedures for the conversion and confirmation of
conversion of heavy ICBM silo launchers, silo training launch-
ers, and silo test launchers.20 3
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ("START I"),2°4 a bilat-
eral agreement that the United States and U.S.S.R. signed in
1991, entered into force in 1994, and is considered to be the
maintaining world peace and stability. Id. The 29th UNGA Resolution called
upon the States Parties to the ABM Treaty (viz. the Russian Federation and the
United States) to exert renewed efforts to preserve and strengthen the Treaty
through full and strict compliance, adopted by a vote of eighty-two in favour to
five against (Albania, Benin, Federated States of Micronesia, Israel, United
States), with sixty-two abstentions. Press Release, U.N. Gap, 69th Meeting, GA/
9675 (1999), at http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/1999/19991201.ga9675.
doc.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). The other UNGA resolutions on the topic
were of similar nature. Id. In the previous year, a UNGA Resolution, UN Doc.
A/55/559-B (Nov. 20, 2000), was concerned with the preservation of and compli-
ance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM
Treaty) and was adopted by a recorded vote of eighty-eight in favour to five
against, with sixty-six abstentions. Id. The five states voting against were Albania,
Federated States of Micronesia, Honduras, Israel, and the United States. An-
other such resolution called on the parties to limit the deployment of anti-ballis-
tic missile systems and to refrain from the deployment of such systems for a
defence of the territory of its country. Id. (describing UNGA Resolution A/
RES/54/54, Preservation of and Compliance with the Treaty on the Liberation of
Anti-Ballistic Missle Systems (Jan. 10, 2000)). The resolution was adopted by a
recorded vote of eighty in favour to four against (Albania, Federated States of
Micronesia, Israel, United States), with sixty-eight abstentions. Id.
199 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/





204 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Jul. 13, 1991, U.S.-U.S.S.R., available at
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/startl/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
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heir to SALT II. START I, Article V(18) now effectively com-
pletes OST, Art IV between the two major space powers, as both
parties are "not to produce, test, or deploy systems, including
missiles, for placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit or a fraction of an
earth orbit." START I established a ceiling to both the number
and location of ICBMs and SLBMs that could be used to place a
payload in the upper atmosphere or outer space.2 °5
According to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation On Strategic Offensive Re-
ductions ("The Moscow Treaty"),206 START I of 1991 is to con-
tinue in force between Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.
The Moscow Treaty requires each party to reduce and limit its
strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200 by December 31,
2012.207 An Implementation Committee will meet twice a year.
The US plans to retire all fifty of its ten-warhead Peacekeeper
ICBMs and convert four Trident submarines from strategic to
conventional service.208
The 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range
and Shorter-Range Missiles 209 required elimination of all Soviet
and American longer-range intermediate nuclear force
("LRINF") missiles, those with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500
kilometers, as well as the elimination of shorter-range intermedi-
ate nuclear force ("SRINF") missiles, with ranges between 500
and 1,000 kilometers.210
205 Id. art. IV.
206 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation in
Strategic Offensive Reduction, U.S.-Russ. (May 24, 2002), at http://www.state.
gov/t/ac/trt/18016.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2005) [hereinafter the Moscow
Treaty]. On Feb. 5, 2003, the U.S. Senate approved the Moscow Treaty by a
unanimous vote. Id. The U.S. Senate then unanimously approved the U.S.-Rus-
sian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty on March 6, 2003. Id. As for the Rus-
sian Federation, the State Duma ratified the Treaty on May 14, 2003 by a 294-134
vote. Id.
207 Id.
208 The White House, Fact Sheet-Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions
(May 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-
23.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
200 U.S. Department of Defense Treaty on the Elimination of the Intermediate
Range and Short Range Missiles, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 I.L.M. 84, Dec. 8, 1987, avail-
able at http://www.state.gov/t/np/trty/18432.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
210 Id.
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c. International Trade Treaties
Economic space treaties were a delicate attempt to balance
the liberalization of trade in the space launch industry with the
concerns of space national-security and the proliferation of
weapons technology.2 1' The international space legal structure
benefited from the process of trade liberalization, as this process
expanded the global acceptance of the space treaties. However,
the liberalization process also produced certain incidents of
concern pertaining to the proliferation of what was considered
by the United States as sensitive technology.2 12 The liberaliza-
tion began in 1984 when President Reagan permitted the export
of satellites for launch by European launchbrs.2 1 3 This policy
initiative was eventually expanded in 1989 to allow the launch of
American satellites aboard Chinese launchers, namely, AUSSAT
and ASIASAT. 14 However, at the time, China had not acceded
to the Liability Convention. Thus, before allowing the satellites
to be exported to China for launch, China and the United States
signed a Memorandum of Agreement on Liability for Satellite
Launches. 5 China also expressed, within the Memorandum,
its intention to accede to the Liability Convention, thus facilitat-
ing future launches of American satellites. Other similar ar-
rangements were also concluded with the Russian Federation in
1993216 after the Russian Federation agreed to abide by the Mis-
211 For an excellent analysis, see Hector Petrus van Fenema, The International
Trade in Launch Services: The Effects of U.S. Laws, Policies and Practices on its
Development, (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden
(Netherlands)) [hereinafter International Trade in Launch Services].
212 In 1997, allegations surfaced that China was obtaining military useful infor-
mation by launching U.S. satellites. The charges concerned investigations into
launch failures involving U.S. built satellites where two U.S. companies (Loral
and Highes) allegedly assisted China in understanding the cause of the accidents
and how to remedy them. The State Department has not granted any export
licenses for sending communications satellites to China since then, and Chinese
commercial space launch operations have consequently been suspended. Id.
213 International Trade in Launch Services, supra note 211.
214 Memorandum of Agreement Between China and the United States of
America Regarding International Trade in Commercial Launch Services, Jan. 26,
1989, U.S.-P.R.C., 28 I.L.M. 596, 599; Memorandum of Agreement on Liability
for Satellite Launches Between the Government of the United States of America
and the People's Republic of China, Jan. 26, 1989, U.S.-P.R.C. 28 I.L.M. 596, 609.
215 National Space Development Agency of Japan, at http://www.nasda.go.jp/
lib/space-law/chapter_3/3-2-2-8_e.html.
216 Agreement Between the United States and Russia Amending the Agree-
ment of Sept. 2, 1993, Regarding International Trade in Commercial Launch
Services, Jan. 30, 1993, U.S.-Russ., State Dept. No. 96-37, available at http://www.
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sile Technology Control Regime.2 17 The Ukraine acted similarly
in 1995.28 Presently, Europe, China, Ukraine, India, andJapan
all offer satellite commercial launches. These agreements estab-
lished quotas limiting the number of American satellites that
could be launched from outside the territory of the United
States. Also, in order to protect the American launch industry
from what could have been unfair competition from non-market
economies, the agreements also included pricing provisions. 2' 9
d. Missile Technology Control Regime
The Missile Technology Control Regime ("MTCR")
originated in 1987 and is designed to restrict the proliferation of
nuclear-capable missiles and related technology. 21  The regime
was later expanded in 1993 to include missiles for the delivery of
chemical or biological weapons.2 2' It is important to stress that
the MTCR is not a treaty but rather a voluntary arrangement
between concerned states.222 MTCR States apply a common ex-
jada.jp/jdal/library/space-law/chapter_4/4-2-2-14/index-e.html (last visited
Feb. 22, 2005) [hereinafter the MTCR].
217 Department of State, U.S. Missile Technology Control Regime Bureau of
Nonproliferation (Jan. 7, 1993), available at http://wv.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5073.
htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2005). A Technology Safeguard Agreement was signed
between the United States, the Russian Federation, and Kazakhstan prior to the
first Russian launch of an American satellite. Marcia B. Smith, Resources, Sci-
ence, and Industry Division Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Com-
mercial Competition and Satellite Exports (2003), available at http://usinfo.state.
gov/usa/infousa/tech/space/launch.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). However,
this agreement was signed only after Russia agreed to comply with the MTCR in a
case involving a Russian company, Glavkosmos, that planned to sell rocket engine
technology to the Indian Space Research Organization ("ISRO"). The United
States declared it violated the MTCR and imposed two-year sanctions against
Glavkosmos and ISRO. In June 1993, the United States threatened to impose
sanctions against Russian companies that did business with Glavkosmos. The two
countries finally agreed that Russia would cease transferring engine technology
to India.
218 Id.; see also Department of State, Fact Sheet Satellite Technology Safeguards
Agreement (Jan. 26, 1999), available at http://ww.fas.org/news/kazakh/
99012604 (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
219 See Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China Regard-
ing International Trade in Commercial Launch Services, (Mar. 13, 1995), at
http://www.nasda.go.jp/lib/space-law/chapter_4/4-2-2-13/indexe.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005). See also van Fenema, supra note 211, at 183-244.
220 Missle Technology Control Regime, at http://wwv.mtcr.info/english (last
visited Aug. 16, 2005).
221 Id.
222 Id.
46 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [70
port control policy ("MTCR Guidelines") on an agreed-upon list
("MTCR Annex") .223 As of December 1, 2003, thirty-three states
have adhered to the MTCR.224 The regime has had mixed suc-
cess.225  The MTCR has been criticized by the non-member
States as being a cartel, impeding the development of their own
space national-security capabilities. 226
223 Missile Technology Control Regime, Equipment, Software and Technology An-
nex (Oct. 7, 2004) at http://www.mter.info/english/Annex2005-001.pdf.
224 See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Non-Proliferation, Fact Sheet (De-
cember 23, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/27514pf.htm.
225 According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the MTCR
has a history of mixed failures and success. The failures include "missile develop-
ments in North Korea, India, and Pakistan," while successes include "the suppres-
sion of the Argentine, Egyptian, and Iraqi Condor II ballistic missile program,
and South African and Central European missile activities." Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, How Effective is the Missile Technology Control Regime?,
at http://www.ceip.org/files/publications/ProliferationBrief407.asp (Apr. 12,
2001).
226 For example, the Pakistan Mission to the UN presented a paper arguing
that:
[a] rms control and non-proliferation regimes are established osten-
sibly to attenuate the threats to international peace and security
posed by the spread of sensitive or dual-use equipment and tech-
nology. Over the last twenty-five years, industrially advanced states
have made determined efforts to achieve these objectives by enforc-
ing export restrictions through supplier's cartels. The institutional-
ization of such cartels, such as the Zangger Committee, the London
Club, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime,
and the latest Wassenaar Arrangement, have led to a debate about
the effectiveness and legitimacy of these arrangements . . .Firstly,
the MTCR is not a negotiated multilateral treaty. It is a cartel
formed by some industrialized countries for the purpose of placing
controls on the transfer of technology, which could contribute to
the manufacture of ballistic missiles with nuclear weapon delivery
systems. There is no commitment on the part of the originators of
the MTCR to engage in good faith efforts to eliminate ballistic mis-
siles globally. It is, therefore, essentially an arrangement for pro-
moting their own security interests only .. . Secondly, the MTCR
has been selectively implemented by the supplier states. The seri-
ous international controversy in late 1989 over the implementation
of the MTCR, not only exposed the arbitrary nature of the applica-
tion of the regime, but also cast serious doubts on its credibility.
Over strong U.S. objections, France insisted on its right to proceed
with the sale to Brazil of liquid fuel technology, and it was only after
two years of dispute that the contract was finally suspended. As
against that, Germany's involvement in developing guidance tech-
nology for the Indian "Agni" intermediate range missile continued
. . .Thirdly, its legitimacy is questionable. The MTCR does not
fulfill the requirements of equity, non-discrimination, and equal se-
curity for all states, all of which are essential elements in establish-
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2. Treaties Applicable During International Armed Conflict
International humanitarian law, also known as Law of Armed
Conflict ("LOAC"), is applicable to the use of force to, within,
and from outer space. LOAC has a distinct status within the
corpus of space national-security law. The distinctiveness of
LOAC stems from the fact that LOAC is hard law, identifiable
and subject to sanctions enforceable by courts27
ing durable and credible international agreements in the field of
disarmament. The attempt by some countries to elevate the MTCR
to the level of a multilateral disarmament agreement, or to charac-
terize it as codifying international law, creates serious difficulties.
Since the MTCR is not a treaty with specific rights and obligations,
it has remained just a political instrument which functions in a dis-
criminatory manner, and may even have prevented the establish-
ment of a more stable system of international-security.
Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, Missile Technology
Control Regime - Its Destabilizing Effect on South Asia (July 23, 1997), at
http://www.un.int/pakistan/13970723.htm. Seema Gahlaut writes that:
It continues to be a 'club' and many of its provisions remain prob-
lematic for the space programmes of states such as India. Yet, sev-
eral notable developing countries have joined the MTCR and
China has agreed to abide by some of its guidelines. Indeed, it is
under this agreement that China has promised to curtail its missile-
exports to Pakistan and North Korea. States with substantial space
and missile programmes, which remain outside the MTCR's frame-
work, have claimed that its provisions infringe on their sovereign
right to develop and/or export such technologies. Both India and
North Korea fall in this category.
Seema Gahlaut, India and the MTCR, The Hindu (Aug. 14, 1999), at http://
www.indianembassy. org/press/NewDelhiPress/August_ 1999/India MTCR_
August 14_1999.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
227 Justice James E. Baker of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces eloquently describes the LOAC and its relation to military command:
First the LOAC is hard law; that is it is identifiable and subject to
effective sanction in US criminal law and in international law. Sec-
ond, the LOAC is realistic law that relies on contextual principles
adaptable to changing circumstances. Third, the LOAC is good
policy and usually consistent with military effectiveness. In many
contexts there are good policy reasons to restrict the manner in
which a target is attacked that go beyond limitations required by
the LOAC. As a result, a process of target decision entails the exer-
cise of policy discretion as well as legal judgment and military
command.
James E. Baker, The Role of the Lawyer in War: LBJ's Ghost: A Contextual Approach to
Targeting Decisions and the Commander in Chief 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 407, 407-08
(2003).
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The fundamental principles of LOAC are proportionality, hu-
manity, discrimination, and military necessity. 228 LOAC is
mainly composed of two systems of law woven from these princi-
ples: the Geneva system and the Hague system. The Geneva sys-
tem is primarily concerned with maintaining human security
and dignity during armed conflicts. The Hague system is cen-
tered upon the legitimacy of the means and methods of con-
ducting hostilities. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in
the Nuclear Weapons Case has recognized the universal nature
of this body of law as customary international law. 2 9 The Hague
system has a specific disposition that can be directly applicable
to the security of space assets.
Article 27 of the Annex to Hague IV, offers protection from
intentional attack to buildings dedicated to science, provided
they are not being used at the time for military purposes. 2 0 Ar-
ticle 27 of the Annex to Hague IV can be interpreted to offer
additional protection to purely scientific satellites and their re-
spective ground stations. Furthermore, this article creates an
obligation for the belligerent State controlling such scientific
buildings to indicate these by the use of visible signs and to no-
tify the enemy beforehand. Thus, satellites and their architec-
ture that are used for science and not for military purposes,
must be properly identified in order to benefit from their pro-
tected status.
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I) also
contains dispositions that have a direct impact on space na-
tional-security. Article 35.3 states that "it is prohibited to employ
methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be ex-
pected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment." Within AP I, article 35, the natural envi-
228 Michel Bourbonniere, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the Neutralisation of
Satellites, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 43, 47-51 (2004).
229 Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996
I.CJ. 226, 248-56 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Case].
230 Annex to the Convention Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, art. 27, 36, stat. 2277 (Oct. 18, 1908), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON
THE LAWS OF WAR 78 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., Oxford University
Press 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR]. It is impor-
tant to note that "[tihe Nuremberg International Military Tribunal had already
found in 1945 that the humanitarian rules included in the Regulations annexed
to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 "were recognized by all civilized nations and
were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war." 1 INTERNA-
TIONAL WAR TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, 14 NOVEMBER 1945 1
OCTOBER 1946, 246 (Nuremberg), (1947); see also Nuclear Weapons Case, supra
note 229, at 257.
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ronment is itself the object of protection. AP I, article 35 is con-
cerned with the consequences of the use of any weapon,
whatsoever, be it a kinetic or directed-energy weapon, and is
thus applicable to sophisticated space weaponry. Furthermore,
the conditions that result from the use of the weapon are ex-
pressed within AP I as being cumulative. In other words, the
damage to the natural environment must be, at the same time,
widespread, long-term, and severe.
Perfidy is an essential concept that permeates LOAC. "Per-
fidy" is the hostile use of a belligerent's obligation to respect
LOAC in order to kill, wound or capture another belligerent. 231
It is important not to confuse an act of perfidy with a ruse of
war, which is legal. The registration of a military satellite under
the Registration Convention as a civilian satellite would be a vio-
lation of IHL, feigning civilian status, and could, depending
upon the use of the satellite, become an act of perfidy. An at-
tack on satellite signals that would alter the content of the com-
munication must not mislead the enemy as to the legal status of
a belligerent, as this could also be considered an act of perfidy.
The development of a space weapon presupposes much re-
search, development, and testing. AP I, article 36 imposes cer-
tain rules pertaining to the development of new weapons. In
the development of new weapons, a state must verify whether its
employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited
by the Protocol or by any other rule of international law. Re-
grettably, several important space powers, including the United
States, India, and Pakistan, have either not signed or not ratified
the Additional Protocol I.
The use of force to, from, and within space can only be exer-
cised against legitimate military objectives. Considering that ci-
vilian commercial space assets have a dual use, and often have
military clients, the determination of a legitimate military objec-
tive in outer space can be quite complicated. Within the docu-
ment, Rebuilding America's Defenses, Strategy, Forces and Resources
For a New Century, the author advocates targeting commercial
space assets in order to prevent enemy use of these assets. 23 2
231 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
art. 37, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 12, 1977), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR, supra note 230, at 447 [hereinafter AP I].
232 Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America's Defenses, Stragety,
Forces and Resources (Sept. 2000), at http://www.newamericancentury.org/repub
licamericasdefenses.pdf.
2005]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The point of concern is that the targeting of these commercial
assets is advocated irrespective of their nationality. A Bush doc-
trine use of pre-emptive force against the space assets of a neu-
tral state could be a violation of the laws of neutrality. A more
recent publication by the United States Air Force presents a
more balanced perspective on this issue, advocating the use of
economic and diplomatic means to deny enemy use of third
party commercial space assets. 23 3 Certain dual-use space assets
are easily discernible as legitimate military objectives, such as
communication, remote sensing, and navigation satellites.
These assets can easily be construed as having an effective con-
tribution to military action. Targeting is more dubious in the
case of a meteorological satellite. A meteorological satellite can
be more easily construed as a vital civilian infrastructure. Fur-
thermore, given the capability of armies to operate in various
weather conditions, the military advantage of neutralizing a me-
teorological satellite remains questionable.
The corpus of International Humanitarian Law also contains
certain dispositions concerning inquiries which can apply to mil-
itary space activities during an international armed conflict. In
particular, the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field of 1949 proscribes in Article 52 that a party to a conflict
may request that an inquiry be instituted concerning alleged vio-
lations of the Convention. Should this Convention be breached
during the conduct of space military operations during an inter-
national armed conflict, in inquiry on the breach could take
place .234
The ENMOD Convention prohibits the hostile use of Environ-
mental Modification Techniques (EMT).235 Prohibited EMTs
include "any techniques for changing-through the deliberate
manipulation of natural processes-the dynamics, composition,
or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydro-
sphere, and atmosphere, or of outer space. ''236 An "understand-
233 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-21, Counterspace Operations (Aug. 2, 2004),
at http://www.dtic.mil.doctrine/jel/servicepubs/afdd2-2- .pdf.
234 See also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 53, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
235 The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, art. I, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. 9614, 1108
U.N.T.S. 157 (May 18, 1977), available at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4783.
htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2005) [hereinafter the ENMOD].
236 Id. art. II.
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ing" relating to Article II, which is part of the negotiating
record, includes "changes in the state of the ozone layer and
changes in the state of the ionosphere.
23 7
The ENMOD prohibits technologies whose use would have
"widespread, long-lasting or severe effects."' 23 8 "' Widespread' is defined
as encompassing an area of several hundred square kilometers;
'long-lasting' is defined as lasting approximately a season; and 'se-
vere' is defined as involving significant disruption or harm to
human life, natural and economic resources or other assets.
2 9
Although the ENMOD and AP I, article 35 use identical verbi-
age, their meanings have been conventionally defined as being
different. For example, within AP I, the term "long-term" is inter-
preted to mean lasting decades.240
The 1980 U.N. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects,"' and its 1995 Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weap-
ons,2 4 2 can have an impact on space weaponry should a space-
capable laser be specifically designed to cause permanent blind-
ness to humans.
3. Space National-security and Disarmament Law
There are three fundamental documents on international dis-
armament. Although these do not specifically address the legal-
ity of space-capable weapons, they are important to the debate
concerning space-capable weapons and space national-security.
These are:
237 Id.
238 Id. art. I.
239 Id. (defining these terms within the Narrative).
240 See ICRC Commentary. AP I, at 1453.
241 Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conven-
tional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523 (Apr. 10, 1981), re-
printed in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 230, at 520.
242 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, Oct. 13, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1218, re-
printed in DOCUMENTS OF THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 230, at 535.
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a. The Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations.243
The Declaration states that all States shall pursue, in good faith,
negotiations for the early conclusion of a universal treaty on
general and complete disarmament under effective interna-
tional control, and strive to adopt appropriate measures to re-
duce international tensions and to strengthen confidence
among States.244
b. Final Document, Special Session of the General Assembly
on Disarmament 1978.245
The Final document declares that an:
Arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to ef-
forts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to es-
tablish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and
trust between all States and to develop broad international co-
operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the reali-
zation of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles,
of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sover-
eignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of any State, peaceful
settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of States.2 4 6
The document continues the argument, stating that
"[d] isarmament, relaxation of international tensions, respect for
the right to self-determination and national independence, the
peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, and the strengthening of international
peace and security are directly related to each other. '24 7
The document then argues that: "[e]nduring international
peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weap-
onry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious bal-
243 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Annex, Supp. No.28, at
121, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1970).
244 Id. at 123.




ance of deterrence or doctrine of strategic superiority,"248 and
that:
all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of
disarmament. All States have a right to participate in disarma-
ment negotiations. They have the right to participate on an
equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations,
which have a direct bearing on their national-security. While dis-
armament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear weapon
States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament
and together with other military significant States for halting the
arms race.
2 49
The document concludes with a paragraph, wherein, State
members of the U.N. "solemnly reaffirm their determination to
make further collective efforts aimed at . . . halting and revers-
ing the arms race.
250
c. The Nuclear Weapons Test Case 25'
In Paragraph 99, the International Court ofJustice ("ICJ") de-
clares that it appreciates the importance of the recognition of
Article IV of the NPT to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good
faith.25  The ICJ opined in paragraph 102, stating that the "obli-
gation expressed in Article VI of the NPT includes its fulfillment
in accordance with the basic principle of good faith ... set forth
in Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Charter . .. [and] reflected in
the Declaration on Friendly Relations Between States. ' 253 As
well, U.N. Security Council Resolution 984 from 11 April 1995
affirms "the need for all states party to the Treaty on the Non-




251 See Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 229, at 830.
252 See NPI, supra note 159.
253 Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 229, at 830; see Declaration and Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Annex, Supp. No.28, at
121, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1970), available at http://www.tamilnatum.org/selfdeter
mination / instruments / 2625GAdeclarationofprinciplesofinternationallaw. htm;
see also The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
14 I.L.M. 1292 (Aug. 1, 1975) [hereinafter Helsinki Declaration].
254 S.C. Res. 924, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/984 (1995) available at http://
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/106/06/PDF/N9510606.pdf (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005).
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These documents, taken together, provide an interesting ar-
gumentation for disarmament. Nonetheless, the argumentation
remains ineffective as these documents fail to prove a rule of
customary international law in favor of international disarma-
ment. The coup de grace to the argumentation lies in its incapac-
ity to provide the required opinion juris et necessitates for the
creation of an international customary norm. Articles 51, 52, 53
and 54 of the U.N. Charter codify the right of self-defense of
States.255 It is important to note that the dispositions of the U.N.
Charter that deal with disarmament do not impose any obliga-
tions to disarm. Article 11 of the U.N. Charter states that the
General Assembly may "consider general principles of co-opera-
tion in the maintenance of international peace and security, in-
cluding the principles governing disarmament. '256 Article 11
gives more power to the U.N. Security Council, declaring it "re-
sponsible for formulating with the assistance of the military staff
Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to
the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a
system for the regulation of armaments. 25 7
4. Space National-security and the U.N. system
The United Nations Security Council has not been called
upon to address directly issues of space national-security. None-
theless, a 1995 U.N. Security Council Resolution does have some
impact on space national-security. In 1995, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 984 on security assurances against the use of
nuclear weapons. 258 - The Resolution states "any aggression with
the use of nuclear weapons would endanger international peace
and security. '2 59 Furthermore, the Security Council takes note
of the statements made by the nuclear-weapon States in which
they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons,
in general, and hence in outer space, to non-nuclear-weapons
states that are parties to the NPT.26 °
The United Nations General Assembly ("UNGA") has been
more active on outer space military issues. The General Assem-
bly passes an annual resolution on the Prevention of an Arms
255 U.N. CHARTER, arts. 51-54.
256 Id. art. 11.
257 Id.





Race in Outer Space. Within the text of the resolution, the
UNGA states that the prevention of an outer space arms race
would avert a grave danger for international peace and security,
and calls on all States, in particular those with major space capa-
bilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use
of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in space. The
latest resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 174 in favor,
to none against, with four abstentions (Federated States of Mi-
cronesia, Israel, Marshall Islands, United States).21 There ap-
pears to be an international consensus concerning the
importance of preventing an arms race in space. Nonetheless
the major space power, the United States, does not share this
concern as it abstained from the vote.
The General Assembly also adopted a resolution on mis-
siles.262 The resolution articulated a concern for a concerted
approach towards missiles in a balanced and non-discriminatory
manner as a contribution to international peace and security.263
The resolution also requested the Secretary General, with the
assistance of a panel of governmental experts, to be established
in 2004, to explore further the issue of missiles in all its aspects
and to submit a report to the General Assembly's 59th
Session.264
The Conference on Disarmament ("CD") was established in
1979, and is the principal multilateral forum for the discussion
and negotiation of disarmament treaties.265 In fact, the CD was
a result of the first Special Session on Disarmament of the
261 Press Release, 58th U.N. General Assembly Proliferaton of 'Non-Strategic'
Nuclear Weapons, New Agenda for Disarmament Among Issues, as General As-
sembly Adopts 52 First Committee Texts, U.N. Doc. GA//0217 (Aug. 12, 2003),
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/galO217.doc.htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005).
262 G.A. Res. 58/37, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/37 (2003).
The Resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 113 for, three against (Feder-
ated States of Micronesia, Israel, United States), and fifty-six Abstentions. Press
Release, supra note 261.
263 G.A. Res. 58/37, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/37 (2003).
264 Id.
265 Multilateral negotiations at the CD and its predecessor have led to the sign-
ing of several treaties, namely: the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the
1972 Seabed Arms Control Treaty, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapon Con-
vention, the 1977 ENMOD Convention, the 1992 Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion, and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Conference on
Disarmament: An Introduction to the Conference, at http://IwW.unog.ch/
80256EE600585943/ (httppages) /
BF18ABFEFE5D344PC12563100311CE9?opendocument (last visited Aug. 17,
2005) [hereinafter Introduction to the CD Conference].
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United Nations General Assembly held in 1978.266 The CD
meets in annual sessions divided into three parts, the first of
which lasts 10 weeks, and the other two, seven weeks each.267
The CD has a rotating presidency among its member States by
alphabetical order.26 The CD conducts its work and adopts its
decisions by consensus.269
The CD was originally constituted of forty members.270 Its
membership has subsequently been expanded to sixty-five coun-
tries representing all geographical regions and including the
five nuclear weapon states who are also the major space faring
nations (U.S.A., France, Russian Federation, U.K, China).271
All member states participate in the work of the CD under con-
ditions of full equality as independent states.2 7 2
The CD began in 1985 to work on space arms control is-
sues. 2 7 3 The main issue presently within the CD that affects
space security is the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
("PAROS"). The CD is presently at a deadlock on PAROS. 2 74
The paralysis results from a disagreement between key players
on the prioritization of these PAROS, and the work on the Fis-
sile Material Cutoff Treaty ("FMCT") .275 Further complications
have resulted from attempts to link progress on PAROS with a
parallel progress in FMCT negotiations. 276 For the fifth consec-
utive year, the CD was "not able to reach agreement on a pro-
gramme of work," and was "unable to start work on substantive
issues. ' 27 7 Secretary General Kofi Anan has expressed concern
on the protracted lack of agreement on the program of work
266 Id.
267 See Rules of Procedure of the Conference on Disarmament, Conference on Dis-
armament, U.N. Doc. CD/8/Rev.8 (Dec. 19, 2003), available at http://www.unog.
ch/disarm/cdproced.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Rules of
Procedure].
268 In 2003, the rotating Presidency came to Iraq and Iran.
269 Rules of Procedure, supra note 267, art. VI.18.
270 Introduction to the CD Conference, supra note 265.
271 Id.
272 Rules of Procedure, supra note 267, art. 1.3.
273 The Conference on Disarmament Concludes Another Frustrating Year, 73 Disarma-





277 Press Release, Conference on Disarmament to Open 2004 Session on 19
January (Jan. 16, 2004), at http://www2.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/
dc04001e.htm.
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and has called upon the member states to show a renewed politi-
cal will and determination to break the paralysis.278
The International Telecommunications Union ("ITU") is the
oldest agency of the United Nations, predating the U.N. Charter
itself. Nonetheless, the most recent treaty document was
adopted in 1992, and its constitution was also recently
adopted. 279 The ITU, through its Radio Regulations Board
("RRB"), regulates the international use of the radio spectrum,
which is considered to be a limited natural resource.
Under Article 48 of the ITU Constitution, member States
maintain their entire freedom concerning military radio installa-
tions. Nonetheless, military radio installations must, so far as
possible, observe measures to prevent harmful interference.280
The ITU Constitution also codifies the right of States to impede
the transmission of any private telegram or telecommunications,
in whole or in part, which may appear dangerous to the security
of the State or contrary to its laws.28' Such stoppage of commu-
nications must be immediately notified to the ITU, unless such
notification also poses a danger to the security of the State. Sub-
ject to telecommunications concerning the safety of life or dis-
tress calls and messages, Article 41 of the ITU Constitution
grants government telecommunications a right of priority over
other telecommunications.28 2 Government telecommunications
are defined within the Annex to the ITU Constitution as includ-
ing those originating from a head of state, head of government
278 Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Revitalizing Conference on Disarma-
ment Requires Renewed Political Will Determination, Says Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. SG/SM/8584 (Jan. 21, 2003), available at http://www.unis.unvienna.
org/pressrels/2003/sgsm8584.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2005).
279 Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, International
Telecommunications Union, available at http://www.ito.int/aboutitu/basic-
texts/convention.html [hereinafter ITU Convention]; Constitution of the Inter-
national Telecommunications Union, International Communications Union,
available at http://www.itu.int/aboutitu/basic-texts/constitution.html [hereinaf-
ter ITU Constitution]. For an excellent description of the role of ITU, see Fran-
cis Lyall, Communications Regulations: The Role of the International Telecommunication
Union, 3J.L. & TECH (1997).
280 ITU Constitution, supra note 279, art. 48 203.
281 Id. art. 34, 180-81; see also THOMAS C. WINGFIELD, THE LAW OF INFORMA-
TION CONFLICT: NATIONAL-SECURITY LAw IN CYBERSPACE 322-37 (Aegis Research
Corporation 2000); see also ITU Workshop on Creating Trust in Critical Network
Infrastructures, A Collective Security Approach to Protecting the Global Critical Infra-
structure, ITU Doc. CNI/09 (May 20, 2002).
282 ITU Constitution, supra note 279.
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or members of a government, or commanders-in-chief of mili-
tary forces (land, sea, or air).283
The term "harmful interference" is defined within the Annex to
the ITU Constitution as "interference, which 'ndangers the
functioning of a radionavigation service or of other safety ser-
vices or seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a
radiocommunication service operating in accordance with Ra-
dio Regulations. 28 4
5. Interpretation of "National Technical Means"
Certain space national-security treaties contain a protective
envelope for "national technical means" of verification.285 The
concept "national technical means" includes space-based assets,
such as intelligence or Earth remote-sensing satellites. 286 The
important question to be determined is whether the treaty-based
protective envelope concerning "national technical means" can
be expanded to include commercial remote-sensing satellites.
The possible expansion of this protective envelope to include
commercial remote sensing satellites will be contingent on the
interpretative evolution of "national technical means." The pos-
sible interpretive evolution of the concept "national technical
means" may occur on three different levels. The first level of
interpretation, namely a restrictive interpretation, would cause
an exclusion from the protective envelope of commercial satel-
lites owned by nationals of the signatory states. A restrictive in-
terpretation would thus maintain the protective envelope only
for intelligence satellites owned by governments that are parties
to the treaty. On a second level of interpretation, a more expan-
sive interpretation could include within the protective envelope
the commercial satellites of the signatory States from which the
State party purchases earth remote-sensing data, but would ex-
clude foreign-owned earth imaging satellites from the protective
envelope. On a third level of interpretation, a very expansive
interpretation would seek to include in the protective envelope
all commercial imaging satellites from which a signatory govern-
ment purchases verification data. The first level of interpreta-
tion, following a more literal interpretation, is certainly logical
283 Id.
284 ITU Constitution, supra note 279.
285 See Article by Article Analysis of the Treaty Text, at http://www.fas.org/
nuke/control/startl/text/abatext.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2005) (analyzing Ar-
ticle IX of the TART Treaty).
286 Id.
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with the text, but probably could be deemed not reasonable, as
it could be cogently argued that an overly restrictive interpreta-
tive posture would not be in conformity with the intention of
the contracting states. 287 The third level of interpretation is
most probably overly expansive, as it would result in a treaty that
would include the protection of satellites under the jurisdiction
and control of a third state. 288 The second level of interpreta-
tion is probably the most reasonable interpretation. The second
level of interpretation is certainly textually logical and probably
conforms the most with the intent of the signatories. This exclu-
sion from the protective envelope nonetheless creates a compar-
ative competitive disadvantage to non-U.S. satellites that want to
sell data to the U.S. military, such as SPOT or RADARSAT.
From a commercial paradigm, the resulting perspective is that
of an increased business risk for non-U.S. satellites. Lastly, it is
important to note that the CFE treaty presents a textual evolu-
tion of the protective envelope as the protective envelope within
the CFE also includes multinational technical means. The CFE
protective envelope is, however, limited to verification for ensur-
ing compliance with the treaty. The question can also be asked,
in the case of the CFE, as to the possible inclusion of private
commercial satellite ventures within the protective envelope of
multinational technical means.
III. CONCLUSION
A symbiotic relationship exists between military-use of outer
space and the U.N. Charter. The symbiosis is seen in the fact
that outer space military technology has both influenced the in-
terpretation of the U.N. Charter, while simultaneously being
subject to the U.N. Charter. The influence of space military
technology upon the U.N. Charter is seen in the interpretative
history of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. An exegetical analysis
of Article 51 limits the right of self-defense in cases of "armed
287 Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that "A
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose." Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.
31.1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://wwv.un.org/law/ik/text/treaties.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
288 A third state is defined in the Vienna Convention as a state not party to the
treaty. Id. art. 2.1(h). Furthermore, this would probably be a violation of the
fundamental principle that a treaty applies only between the parties to it. Brown-
lie, supra note 7, at 619.
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attack." The drafting history of Article 51 supports this interpre-
tation, as the drafters attempted to close the door on anticipa-
tory self-defense. 289  Nonetheless, the practice of States has
proven different. Military space technology through the use of
ICBM rendered the restrictive interpretation of Article 51 un-
tenable, resulting in the legitimacy of an anticipatory self-de-
fense interpretative premise.
Article 42 of the U.N. Charter does not make reference to
space assets. Nonetheless, the UN Charter has proven to be a
living document with a capacity to adapt to the evolution of na-
tional-security concerns.290 A restrictive interpretation of Article
42 of the U.N. Charter would probably be considered by most as
incorrect.
Certain historical events have had an important influence on
the development of space national-security law. First, there was
the Cold War. The space treaties were negotiated during the
Cold War epoch of systemic competition. The space treaties re-
flect the national-security concerns of that epoch, attempting to
deal with competing security concerns, while establishing safe
access to space. The space treaties contributed significantly to
creating a legal matrix regulating national-security in space.
Space treaties have received wide accession. On this point, it is
interesting to note that the United States considers the right to
transit outer space as a norm of customary international law.29'
Other important historical events that influenced the devel-
opment of space national-security law are the break-up of the
U.S.S.R., the liberalization of international trade, the prolifera-
tion in weapons of mass destruction, and launch capabilities.292
The geopolitical environment has mutated since the epoch of a
bi-polar and bi-power conflict to one with an increase of ballistic
missile threat from a multiplicity of State actors. This concern
affected the instruments that deal in the international trade in
289 FRANK, supra note 6, at 50.
290 See Simma, supra note 16; Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case,
1962 I.CJ. 151 (July 20) (authorizing peacekeeping).
291 The United States considers the space systems of any State to be national
property with the right of peaceful passage through space without interference.
National Science and Technology Council, The White House, Fact Sheet: Na-
tional Space Policy, available at http://ostp.gov/NSTC/html/fs/fs-5.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005).
292 See National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the
Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, Unclassified Summary of a National Intel-
ligence Estimate (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF BIF_
otherprod/missilethreat200l.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
SPACE SECURITY LAW
launch services, such as the MTCR. The MTCR is, however,
proving to be somewhat controversial. The MTCR is greatly ap-
preciated as an important contribution to space national-secur-
ity by those who participate in the select club. On the other
hand, the MTCR is perceived by states that do not participate in
it as a restrictive cartel impeding the development of their own
space national-security capabilities. 2 -
The historical events have forced an evolution in the space
national-security normative matrix. The evolution has occurred
in various ways. For example, in reaction to events, certain State
actors have sought to alter the interpretation of normative in-
struments. The reinterpretation of the ABM was perhaps the
most eloquent example of such a reaction.2"4 Another reaction
to change has been States' withdrawal from certain interna-
tional agreements deemed inadequate within the new security
context. Perhaps the best example of such a reaction is the
United States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Other reac-
tions followed. The Chinese and Russians have reacted by at-
tempting to create new normative instruments by proposing a
treaty on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. On
the institutional level, certain institutions are experiencing diffi-
culties in adapting to these changes. Perhaps the best example
is the Conference on Disarmament, which is presently stale-
mated in a diplomatic zugzwang.
The testing of weapons in space causes an interesting prob-
lem. An analogy between the freedom of exploration and use of
outer space, and the freedoms enjoyed by nations on the high
seas illustrates the issues. There are two perspectives on the le-
gitimacy of testing weapons, which would result in the closure of
large areas of the oceans.29 5 Some argue that such tests are an
exercise in freedom of the seas; others argue that it is a denial of
the freedom. This debate can easily be transported to outer
space. Brownlie argues that this is a debate of reasonableness
and mutuality and that these principles apply in times of war as
well as in times of peace.2 9" In any case, the principle of "due
regard" applies in outer space. Article IX of the OST edicts that
"State Parties .. .shall conduct their activities . . .with due re-
gard to the corresponding interests of all other State Parties to
i!93 Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, supra note
226.
294 See Sofaer, supra note 182.
295 BROWNLIL, supra note 7, at 239.
296 Id. at 239-40.
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the Treaty." '297 In certain cases, Article IX would require consul-
tations. This would apply to the weaponization of space and to
the conduct of hostilities in outer space. Furthermore, nuclear
weapon testing in space has been banned, 298 which would apply
to the testing of nuclear ASAT technologies.
Although some arms control treaties complete the space trea-
ties, from a general perspective, there appears to be a lack of
cohesiveness between space treaties, arms control treaties, and
LOAC treaties, which impact space national-security. This lack
of cohesiveness creates ambivalence and a cognitive dissonance
within the legal structure. As a result, the normative effect is
weakened.
The law affecting space national-security remains treaty-based.
Most treaties date from the Cold War epoch. Paradigms in
space exploitation have evolved towards a greater commercial
use of space. Treaties are slow to change to reflect this paradig-
matic evolution. The slow pace with which treaty law evolves in
relation to the rapidity with which the space milieu evolves cre-
ates a disconnect between the normative structure and the real-
ity of space activities. The result is a reduction in the
effectiveness in outer space national-security law.
297 OST, supra note 8, art. IX.
298 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, 14 U.N.T.S. 43, 2 I.L.M. 889 (Aug. 5, 1963); see Declaration on
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1653, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961); see
also Resolution on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations and Perma-
nent Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, G.A. Res. 2936, U.N. GAOR,
27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 5, U.N. Doc A/8730 (1972); see also Resolution on the
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